Delegitimising Nuclear Violence by Ritchie, Nicholas Edward
This is a repository copy of Delegitimising Nuclear Violence.




Ritchie, Nicholas Edward orcid.org/0000-0002-6397-7498 (2017) Delegitimising Nuclear 





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
y and disarmament Civil society and disarma
nt Civil society and disarmament Civil societ
y and disarmament Civil society and d
ament Civil society and disarmament Civil societ
nt Civil society and disarmament Civil society and d
y and disarmament Civil society and disarma
nt Civil society and disarmament Civil societ
y and disarmament Civil society and d
ament Civil society and disarmament Civil societ
nt Civil society and disarmament Civil society and d
y and disarmament Civil society and disarma
nt Civil society and disarmament Civil societ
y and disarmament Civil society and d
ament Civil society and disarmament Civil societ
nt Civil society and disarmament Civil society and d
y and disarmament Civil society and disarma
nt Civil society and disarmament Civil societ
y and disarmament Civil society and d
ament Civil society and disarmament Civil societ
nt Civil society and disarmament Civil society and d
Civil Society and 
Disarmament
2016
C vil Socie  Engagement in 
Disarmament Processes 
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Ban

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DISARMAMENT
2016
Civil Society Engagement in 
Disarmament Processes 
The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Ban
Note
The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is publishing this material 
within the context of General Assembly resolution 69/71 on the United Nations 
Disarmament Information Programme in order to further an informed debate on topical 
issues of arms limitation, disarmament and security.
This publication on civil society engagement in disarmament processes draws 
on recent research and reflections from literary non-fiction, academia, risk assessment, 
activism and advocacy to present the case for a nuclear weapons ban as a vital first 
step in nuclear weapons’ ultimate abolition. The material appearing in this book is in 
unedited and original form as submitted by the authors. The views of the authors are 
their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations or its Member 
States. 
Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters 
combined with figures. These documents are available in the official languages of 
the United Nations at http://ods.un.org. Specific disarmament-related documents can 
also be accessed through the disarmament reference collection at http://www.un.org/
disarmament/HomePage/library.shtml.






Copyright © United Nations, 2016 
All rights reserved 
Printed in the United Nations, New York
iii
Contents
Introduction: Hibakusha’s hope to ban the bomb
Kathleen Sullivan, PhD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  v
Witness to nuclear war: Hibakusha in Nagasaki 
Susan Southard, MFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
Nuclear risks: Humanitarian consequences, probabilities  
and mitigation 
Patricia Lewis, PhD and Beyza Unal, PhD . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
Climate disruption and global famine: Nuclear weapons  
impact on the environment 
Ira Helfand, MD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
Human consequences of radiation: A gender factor in  
atomic harm
Mary Olson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
Banning the bomb: From 1950s activism to the General 
Assembly via Greenham Common
Rebecca Johnson, PhD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
Delegitimising nuclear violence
Nick Ritchie, PhD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
Revolt and resistance
Ray Acheson, MA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63




Hibakusha’s hope to ban the bomb
Kathleen Sullivan, PhD
When the last shot was fired at the end of the Second World 
War, the death toll and casualty rate defied comprehension. 
By some estimates, 60 million people died, though this does 
not include war-related famine and disease. In the context 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alone, the first and thus far only 
use of nuclear weapons in war, an estimated 210,000 died by 
September of 1945. But still that mountain of fatalities rises 
as each passing year atomic bomb survivors join the ghastly 
statistic through death related to radioactive exposure or 
injuries incurred on two singular points of time that continue 
to stretch beyond seven decades. World War II brought the 
wholesale obliteration of cities and the civilians who inhabited 
them, through fire bombings, massacres and nuclear war. It also 
brought the attempted erasure of entire populations of people, 
with institutions and technology of modernity fueling genocide 
in death camps. It is impossible to know the millions more who 
were wounded, maimed, disfigured, and incapacitated, both 
physically and psychologically, for the rest of their lives. 
The world had changed. But instead of learning from 
the Second World War’s unspeakable carnage, all manner 
of weapons go on proliferating. And still this age of violent 
modernity continues its death march relentlessly forward with 
the development of missile-launching drones, and autonomous 
weapons such as killer robots and most terrifying—the 
continued modernization of nuclear bombs. 
Without a doubt, the most dangerous weapons in the 
world are nuclear. They are a threat to all life on earth. Unlike 
conventional bombs, they are unique in the far-reaching, long-
lasting, wasteland-producing destruction these instruments of 
omnicide provide. Their tremendous power comes through a 
process called nuclear fission, the splitting of the atom—the 
strongest binding power in the universe ripped apart by the 
minds of men, and weaponized.
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The primary effects of a nuclear explosion are the 
incredible blast, heat, fire, and radiation that produce 
destruction on an unimaginable scale. Immense light and 
thermal heat (comparable to the interior of the sun) cause a 
phenomenon called a firestorm. Firestorms deplete oxygen 
from the environment and create hurricane-like winds, which 
suck in debris to further feed the storm, causing super-infernos. 
Nothing can survive a firestorm. And all nature in its wake, the 
environment that supports life on earth, is laid waste. 
The most insidious effect of nuclear weaponry is radiation. 
Once released, radioactive elements hang around for millennia 
upon millennia. They horribly impact the lives of any who 
survive in the present and put future generations at risk for 
cancer and genetic mutations. Due to long-lived radioactive 
poisoning, nuclear weapons have the ability to wage war on 
the future itself by altering the gene pool and threatening the 
continuation of life. 
This we know, and still the techno-military discourse 
disturbingly lingers on what weapons do, who has which 
categories of what weapons, and how many weapons a friend 
or foe possesses—a scarcely disguised contest of nuclear 
machismo. The “peace through strength” emphasis needs 
to contend with what a nuclear explosion will do (and within 
living memory did do) to people and the planet. Thankfully, 
the Cold War approach that has legitimized nuclear arsenals is 
giving way to the moral weight of the Humanitarian Initiative.
In the last 5 years, something extraordinary has happened 
in an unofficial alliance between Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working 
together to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons. After 
three successful state-sponsored conferences in Norway, 
Mexico and Austria focusing on the humanitarian impact of 
nuclear weapons, in December 2014, the Austrian Government 
unveiled the “Humanitarian Pledge” to fill the legal gap for the 
prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It was initially 
supported by 127 nations, united in a call to Nuclear-Weapon 
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States—and those who stand with them—to begin a process 
leading to nuclear disarmament. 
The Humanitarian Initiative is the most significant 
advance for nuclear disarmament in a generation.
This movement has properly reframed the issue of nuclear 
weapons. National posturing based on classes of weapons, 
deployment and deterrence credibility is being rightly replaced 
by the issues of humanitarian and environmental consequences. 
The dawn of nuclear weapons prohibition has finally arrived, as 
most recently evidenced through resolution 71/258 in the United 
Nations General Assembly with 113 States Parties voting in 
favor of a ban treaty process to begin in 2017.
This volume on civil society engagement in disarmament 
processes draws on recent research and reflections from literary 
non-fiction, academia, risk assessment, activism and advocacy 
to present the case for a nuclear ban as a vital first step in 
nuclear weapons’ ultimate abolition.
Susan Southard, award-winning author of Nagasaki: 
Life After Nuclear War, reflects on the witness of atomic 
bomb survivors (hibakusha) who know intimately the horrific 
impacts of nuclear weapons. Recalling disarmament heydays 
and how non-violence and feminism created a catalyst for 
anti-nuclear activism, Dr. Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym 
Institute revisits Greenham Common as a foremother to the 
nascent ban treaty movement. The risk that nuclear weapons 
pose by their very existence is put in sharp relief by Dr. Patricia 
Lewis and Dr. Beyza Unal of Chatham House, where recent 
research has been conducted on the increased likelihood of 
nuclear weapons use by accident or design. Dr. Ira Helfand of 
the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
describes the devastating global effects of what could happen if 
nuclear weapons were used, even in a regional exchange with 
a relatively “small” number of weapons launched. Mary Olson 
of the Nuclear Information Resource Service unfolds the gender 
factor by demonstrating how ionizing radiation, manufactured 
over the last seventy-five years in nuclear-fuel, results in 
greater harm to children, and greater harm to females across the 
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lifespan compared to males. Dr. Nick Ritchie of York University 
UK makes a case for delegitimizing nuclear violence as a path 
towards disarmament. Finally, Reaching Critical Will’s Director, 
Ray Acheson, provides a primer on the practical impacts of a 
nuclear weapons ban and the implementation of such a treaty 
to radically alter the social, economic, political, and legal 
landscape in which nuclear weapons have been allowed to exist 
for far too long. 
Hiroshima survivor Reiko Yamada has said, “We will 
absolutely never give up hope.” After more than 70 years into 
the nuclear age, the hope of hibakusha is finally being made into 
actionable steps by United Nations member states who will no 
longer be bullied by the nuclear powers who have defied their 
treaty obligations to “disarm at an early date”. The time is upon 
us to fulfil that hope and ban the bomb.
1
Witness to nuclear war: Hibakusha in Nagasaki 
Susan Southard, MFA
Even in 2017, 71 years later, the image of a mushroom 
cloud rising over Hiroshima or Nagasaki is what most people 
envision when they think of the 1945 US atomic bombings of 
Japan. These nuclear attacks are perceived as abstract events 
of the past, military directives that brought an end to the long 
and costly global war. But for the tens of thousands of survivors 
who barely escaped death beneath the mushroom clouds, the 
war did not end in August 1945. For them, even now, the war is 
not fully over.
The sheer magnitude of the nuclear blasts, along with 
the incomprehensible number of people killed and injured, 
make it difficult to grasp what the people of Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima experienced. But we must try. Hibakusha (“atomic 
bomb-affected people”) are the only people in history who 
have experienced nuclear warfare, and their journey of post-
nuclear survival and the immediate and long-term impact of the 
atomic bombings have been largely ignored. The experiences of 
hibakusha play a critical role in understanding not only two of 
the most controversial military acts of the 20th century, but also 
current nuclear dangers throughout the world. The survivors’ 
stories must be heard as part of our effort to verifiably and 
irreversibly eliminate nuclear weapons across the globe. 
When air raid alarms blared across Nagasaki on the 
morning of August 9, 1945, thirteen-year-old Yoshida Katsuji 
and six of his friends fled from their school to an air raid 
shelter in the hills and crouched inside. After months of Allied 
bombers flying over the city en route to other targets across 
Japan, Yoshida and his schoolmates—along with everyone in 
Nagasaki—had grown accustomed to piercing air raid sirens 
interrupting their lives day and night. 
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The all-clear sounded just before 11 a.m. People across 
Nagasaki returned to their work sites, domestic chores, lines 
at neighborhood ration stations, or the hillsides surrounding 
the city to scrounge for edible weeds. Yoshida and his friends 
took their time coming down from the mountain, stopping for 
a drink of water at a roadside well near the western edge of the 
Urakami Valley. Six miles above them, two U.S. B-29 bombers 
approached the city. This time, however, Nagasaki’s air raid 
alarms did not blare, presumably because the planes were too 
high for the city’s air raid defense personnel to spot, or because 
two aircraft alone weren’t perceived as a threat. As Yoshida 
lowered a bucket into the well, one of the plane’s bomb bay 
doors opened to release the five-ton plutonium bomb. 
It plunged toward the city at 614 miles per hour. Forty-
three seconds later, a super-brilliant flash of light lit up the 
summer sky, followed by a colossal explosion that rocked 
the city. The massive power of a single bomb crushed homes, 
offices, schools, and hospitals, killing and trapping family 
members, friends, coworkers, and neighbors for miles. The force 
of the blast caused people’s eyeballs to pop out of their sockets 
and glass shards to penetrate their internal organs. Directly 
beneath the bomb, infrared heat rays instantly carbonized 
human and animal flesh and vaporized internal organs. As the 
heat surged outward from the hypocenter, it melted iron, steel, 
and human skin—and caused fires to break out across the city, 
resulting in conflagrations that burned people alive.
“It all happened in an instant,” Yoshida remembered. 
Facing in the direction of the bomb, the tremendous force blast 
threw him backwards 130 feet, and the searing heat brutally 
scorched his face and body. Yoshida landed on his back in a 
shallow rice paddy beneath the still-rising mushroom cloud. 
In less than sixty seconds, a huge portion of Nagasaki had 
vanished, and tens of thousands throughout the city were dead 
or injured.
Yoshida’s parents rushed into the still-smoldering city the 
next morning. They were among the fortunate ones who found 
their family members alive—or at all. After a desperate search, 
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they finally identified Yoshida, now unconscious, among rows 
of injured adults and children on a dirt field of a burned-out 
school where a stranger had placed him. Yoshida’s parents lifted 
his charred, limp body into a broken baby carriage they had 
found in the ruins and pushed him through the blistering ashes, 
four and a half miles over the mountains that had protected their 
home from destruction.
The war ended on August 15. Within weeks, adults and 
children across the city began experiencing mysterious and 
excruciating symptoms: vomiting, fever, dizziness, bleeding 
gums, and hair loss. Purple spots began appearing all over their 
bodies—the effects of their high-dose, whole-body radiation 
exposure at the moment of the blast. Many died in agonizing 
pain within a week of the appearance of their first symptoms. 
Over the next nine months, pregnant women whose fetuses 
had been exposed in utero suffered spontaneous abortions, 
stillbirths, and infant deaths—and many of the babies who 
survived birth developed physical and mental disabilities. 
Men, women, and children, in families or alone, lived in 
the atomic ruins surrounded by makeshift funeral pyres where 
bodies were burned continuously for months, engulfing the city 
in the stench of burning corpses. Yoshida’s mother cared for 
him at home, using heated scissors to scrape out fly eggs and 
hatched maggots crawling in his burned flesh.
In December 1945, Yoshida was carried to a temporary 
relief hospital in Nagasaki, established in a partially-destroyed 
elementary school. Medicines, supplies, and fresh water were 
scarce, and the bodies of dead patients were carried out day 
and night. Soon after, he was transferred to a naval hospital 22 
miles north of Nagasaki, where he received better medical care 
and finally regained consciousness. The left side of Yoshida’s 
body and face began to heal. The right side of his face, however, 
remained scabbed and infected, and his burned right ear rotted 
and fell off. Three excruciating skin graft surgeries later (two of 
which failed), Yoshida was released from the hospital in January 
1947, sixteen months after the bombing. He was fifteen.
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Like countless other survivors with visible scars and 
disfigurement, Yoshida hid inside his house for years after 
the bombing, panicked at the prospect of people’s stares. 
Meanwhile, in makeshift huts in the atomic ashes of the 
Urakami Valley and beyond, people cared for their injured, 
irradiated, and often dying loved ones, even as many of the 
caregivers themselves were injured or ill. For many hibakusha, 
the extreme psychological anguish from the instantaneous 
disappearance of their city and the loss of entire families and 
communities never lifted. Suicides were common. 
Five years after the bombing, leukemia and other 
cancer rates among hibakusha spiked, wreaking terror among 
survivors. For decades, expectant parents who had been exposed 
to the bombs’ radiation were petrified of the potential genetic 
effects on their newborn infants. Many hovered over their 
children for years, afraid that each cough or stomach ache could 
lead to severe illness or death. Even today, radiation scientists 
are actively studying second and third generation hibakusha 
for genetic effects potentially passed down to them from their 
parents and grandparents, reminding us how much we still don’t 
understand about the insidious nature of radiation exposure to 
the human body.
As an older man, Yoshida wears a large black patch 
to cover the place where his right ear used to be; the patch is 
secured by a black elastic band that runs underneath his chin, 
up the other side of his face, and across the top of his nearly 
bald head. Scar tissue covers his face and neck, and his left ear 
is shriveled. When he smiles, his mouth is crooked, revealing 
severely misshapen teeth. Behind large framed glasses, 
Yoshida’s eyes are uneven, one higher than the other.
Yoshida’s survival into adulthood is the result of intense 
determination in the face of the chilling aftereffects of nuclear 
war. Since 1945, he has struggled to eat because he could barely 
open his mouth. His hands remain permanently curled up in 
fists—frozen in the position they were in at the moment of the 
atomic blast; for thirteen years after the war, Yoshida screamed 
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in pain as he held buckets filled with sand in the hope that their 
weight would force his fingers to straighten. It never worked.
By the time he turned eighteen, Yoshida had to find a way 
to help support his family. He had already begun taking short 
walks outside—just a tiny distance from his house at first, then 
a little further, always choosing a time of day with fewer people 
on the streets to avoid their shocked expressions when they 
glimpsed his face. As more able-bodied survivors were slowly 
rebuilding the city, Yoshida found a job in a small warehouse 
of a wholesale food company where he wouldn’t be seen by 
many people. Over and over again, he questioned why this had 
happened to him. Why he hadn’t been given the chance to hide 
from the bomb.
At various intervals over the next seven decades, 
hibakusha cancer rates continued to spike high above normal. 
Survivors said they felt that they had been burned “from the 
inside out,” and they lived in constant fear of when their time 
might come. Many hibakusha never spoke of their atomic 
bomb experiences for the rest of their lives, not only because 
of the trauma and sorrow their memories evoked, but also 
because of the shame and discrimination they would face by 
being identified as a survivor—particularly in marriage and 
employment; potential employers and marriage partners did not 
want to risk the possible long-term health effects from injury 
and whole-body radiation exposure, and potential spouses were 
further terrified that children of hibakusha would experience 
genetic effects from the radiation.
But Yoshida couldn’t hide his identity as a hibakusha. He 
was certain that no woman would marry him—until his mother 
called on a relative of an in-law and asked if she would consider 
Yoshida as her husband. The young woman agreed, and Yoshida 
felt so lucky—though many years later he found out that in the 
early years of their marriage, his wife could not bear to look at 
his face as she lay next to him in their shared bed.
Starting in the mid-1950s, a small number of Nagasaki 
survivors defied social norms and began speaking publicly 
about their atomic bomb experiences. Their goals were 
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simple: to increase people’s awareness in Japan and across 
the world of the immediate and long-term realities of nuclear 
war, and to promote the abolition of nuclear weapons. Some of 
Yoshida’s friends were among these early activists, but Yoshida 
did not join them in speaking out. As much as he believed in 
disarmament and respected their efforts, he could not bring 
himself to stand in front of an audience and see people’s 
expressions of revulsion and disgust, however unintentional, 
when they saw his face. 
One day, a friend asked him to take his place at a talk he 
was scheduled to give for junior high school students visiting 
Nagasaki. Yoshida reluctantly agreed, but when he stood before 
the children and saw grimaces on their faces, he immediately 
regretted his decision. Some girls even began to cry. Pushing 
away his own tears and the grief surging through his body, 
Yoshida told his story. It would be years before he would do so 
again, until he came to terms with his disfigurement and decided 
to never let his shame, or his shyness, keep him from speaking 
out for peace.
The world’s nuclear-armed nations insist that nuclear 
weapons exist as a deterrent to war—an irony that is not lost 
on hibakusha, who find it absurd and angering that nuclear 
weapons are declared to be instruments of peace. For Yoshida’s 
colleague, Taniguchi Sumiteru—whose back was burned off at 
the time of the bombing and for more than seventy years has 
experienced relentless pain—there is only one meaning for the 
word “peace,” and it does not include nuclear weapons. “The 
atomic bomb,” Taniguchi says quietly, “is a destroyer of peace.”
In memory of the more than 224,000 people who died 
in Nagasaki and Hiroshima 71 years ago, and the countless 
more hibakusha who faced the terrors of post-nuclear survival, 
Yoshida and a small cohort of Nagasaki and Hiroshima 
survivors have stood before the world as witnesses to nuclear 
war, providing an understanding that no one else can give. They 
tell their stories to reduce vague notions about nuclear weapons 
and increase understanding of the enduring impact of nuclear 
war. They speak to link this understanding to how we perceive 
7
Civil Society Engagement in Disarmament Processes
the current state of international nuclear readiness and nuclear 
danger. Above all else, Yoshida and other hibakusha activists 
work tirelessly to ensure that Nagasaki remains the last atomic-
bombed city in history.
Now, hibakusha are aging, and their voices are slowly 
disappearing. But their message remains urgently important. 
Whether by military order, accident, or an act by radical 
extremists, and with immensely more powerful nuclear weapons 
today, we are now at high risk for far worse humanitarian and 
environmental nuclear disasters than Nagasaki and Hiroshima. 
The only way to prevent such cataclysmic annihilation is 
the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and the 
establishment of a new era without these instruments of mass 
terror positioned throughout the world. No other measure can 
achieve this goal.
NB: Parts of this chapter are adapted from Nagasaki: Life After 
Nuclear War by Susan Southard. Reprinted by arrangement with 
Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House.
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Nuclear risks: Humanitarian consequences, 
probabilities and mitigation 
Patricia Lewis, PhD and Beyza Unal, PhD
Humans deal with risk every single moment of every day. 
From addressing our diets and decisions on health care, crossing 
the road, driving our cars, riding our bicycles and getting into 
an airplane, we calculate risks, assess the risk-benefit equations 
and make our decisions—which may be smart or foolhardy, 
recognizing that we rarely know until after the decision is made.
Some of those risks are daily small risks that we give little 
thought to because they are so frequent and a normal part of our 
lives. Some are much larger and more consequential—giving 
birth for example or participating in extreme sports—and we tend 
to give these far more thought. For some people, risk is a thrill 
and makes life worth living whereas others avoid major risks as 
much as they possibly can and hope that their governments and 
infrastructure companies do the same. A large number of studies 
have been made on the way humans perceive and deal with 
risk and many industries—particularly engineering, insurance, 
gambling and finance—depend heavily on understanding the risks 
and human interaction within those risks.
Risk is generally constructed as the product of probability 
and consequence. Or rather, perhaps we should say that 
perceived risk is the product of estimated probability and 
imagined consequence. Risk is not static; it is a dynamic, 
changing entity. Our understandings of both probabilities and 
consequences change all the time and those changes must be 
fed into regularly updated risk calculations. Unlike other areas, 
however, probability and consequence assessments of nuclear 
risks have unique aspects. The impact of nuclear weapons 
use and possession is not limited to quantifiable damage to 
infrastructure; it includes humanitarian consequences that would 
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undermine the course of international development, peace and 
stability. 
New information on the consequences of nuclear weapons 
detonations and nuclear testing has changed risk assessment. 
Environmental security, food and water security, cultural 
heritage protection, gender equality, public health are only some 
of the missing factors in nuclear weapons risk calculations. 
Urbanization, for instance, complicates humanitarian response 
and increases the impact of nuclear weapons due to the numbers 
likely to be killed. Future trends indicate that approximately 
two-thirds of the world’s population is projected to be urban by 
2050.1 Considering that cities are included in strategic targeting 
in military postures, a humanitarian catastrophe in this regard 
would be inevitable. 
The estimated probabilities of nuclear weapons use 
are based on factoring a full range of issues, such as system 
engineering problems; numbers of nuclear weapons; explosive 
yields; locations; population numbers; sorties; procedures; and 
so on. More significantly, the number of reported near misses 
and errors improve risk calculations—for example, how many 
times the detonation of a nuclear weapon has been a hair’s 
breadth away and humanity has been saved by the smart 
thinking and courage of a few individuals;2 and how many 
times nuclear weapons could have detonated by accident or, 
as Schlosser points out, humany has been saved by the failure 
of technology, for example the failed failsafe in the hydrogen 
bomb dropped over North Carolina in 1961.3
The predicted consequences of nuclear weapons explosions 
depend on so many factors: the population density of the area 
where it explodes; the yield of the weapon; the height at which 
it is exploded; the weather conditions; the types of buildings 
 1 United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, New 
York.
 2 Patricia Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoit Pelopidas, Too Close for Comfort: 
Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, Chatham House, April 
2014. 
 3 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/20/usaf-atomic-bomb-
north-carolina-1961.
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in the area; how many other weapons are also exploded; how 
much debris makes its way into the weather systems and for 
how long it stays in the atmosphere, etc. These consequences 
not only change with location and weapon systems but also the 
understandings and perceptions of such consequences change 
over time. For example, in recent conflicts, the destruction 
of ancient artefacts and the erasure of cultural history in the 
Middle East and South Asia has caused outrage. Imagine then 
how one nuclear weapon, in one city would destroy every 
statue, monument, building, art gallery and museum that had 
been created and held there over centuries.4 
In recent years, there has been evidence that suggest 
poor procedures are in place at nuclear weapons facilities. For 
example, in August 2007, six US nuclear-armed cruise missiles 
were mistakenly placed under the wings of a B-52 plane and 
went missing for 36 hours in flight from Minot Air Force 
Base in North Dakota to Barksdale, Louisiana; the 2009 crash 
between the United Kingdom’s HMS Vanguard and France’s 
FNS Le Triomphant, two nuclear powered, ballistic missile-
carrying submarines (SSBNs), in the Atlantic Ocean illustrated 
the high risk of accidents at sea; and the break-in at the Y-12 
National Security Complex in 2012 by three peace activists 
(including an 82-year old nun Sr. Megan Rice) showed the very 
lax security at nuclear weapons facilities.5 There are many more 
such near-accidents, or “broken arrow” events, documented. 
Even more worrying are the number of times that nuclear 
weapons have nearly been detonated deliberately as a result of 
faulty information or miscalculation. Most notable have been 
the events in 1983 when the live NATO exercise “Able Archer” 
was erroneously believed to be a cover for an all-out attack 
against the USSR and thwarted by Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav 
Yevgrafovich Petrov6 who decided not to act on the signals 
 4 Patricia Lewis, Beyza Unal, Sasan Aghlani, Nuclear Disarmament: The 
Missing Link in Multilateralism, Research Paper, Chatham House, 
October 2016. 
 5 See reference 2 above. 
 6 The Man Who Saved the World, Dirs: Peter Anthony and Jakob Staberg, 
http://www.themanwhosavedtheworldmovie.com.
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that clearly demonstrated US nuclear missiles on their way to 
Russia. 
Although the recent presidential election in the United 
States may lead to a change in relations, there has been a marked 
rise of tensions between the US and Russia over Ukraine and 
Syria that has affected global nuclear policies, increasing the 
risks of nuclear confrontation. Both states and their allies appear 
to be embracing once again the Cold War logic of nuclear 
deterrence, affecting their policies and calculations. Neither of 
the parties is keen to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, employ 
transparency measures, or establish new confidence-building 
measures, and both countries are modernizing their arsenals. 
The United States and Russia are estimated to maintain 
around 9,700 nuclear warheads, two-thirds of the total nuclear 
warheads in the world today.7 Around 3,800 of these warheads 
are deployed and 1,800 of them are in high-alert status within 
these two States.8 The high-alert status increases the probability 
of inadvertent nuclear-weapon detonations via intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs). Recent research has shown that inadvertent 
use could result from technical malfunctioning that leads to 
false alert, or cyber-attacks to command and control systems. 
False-alerts, an unclassified US Department of State document 
suggested in the late 1970s, “are not a rare occurrence”.9 These 
occurrences pressure the system and increase the level of 
uncertainty when considering response; thus, they destabilize 
deterrence, which is based on keeping the status quo and not 
taking action. The risks of inadvertent or deliberate nuclear 
weapons use increases in times of crisis. 
In the current situation, the status quo is not sustainable. 
The weapons systems relying on the performance of military 
 7 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Status of World Nuclear Forces, 
Federation of American Scientists. 
 8 Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie, Reducing Alert Rates of 
Nuclear Weapons, UNIDIR, January 2013.
 9 United States Department of State, Points to the PM’s memo about the 
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satellites and command and control systems today are 
additionally vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This was not a concern 
during the Cold War. Cyber-attacks on command and control 
systems, including spoofing of global navigation satellite 
systems (GNSS) data and taking control of missile systems are 
now possible if non-trivial. Drone attacks on missile bases or 
on submarines could overcome defences. Both of these new 
threats to the control of nuclear weapons could be carried out 
by states or even by well-resourced non-state armed groups. 
Cyber-attacks to command and control systems, spoofing 
data, by creating false information, and jamming navigational 
(GNSS) signals during an event of crisis—such as in Ukraine, 
Syria, or potentially in the Baltics—could have a knock-on 
effect on strategic military calculations and may increase risks 
of misperception. 
Statements on the potential use10 of nuclear force also 
affect the risks of nuclear confrontation. Concerns are rising 
over Russia’s modernization of its nuclear forces, as well as 
its exercises to train and test its forces while also testing the 
NATO Alliance’s air defense capabilities. NATO, in return, 
conducts warfare exercises, searching for submarines in open-
waters (Dynamic Manta 2016) or carrying out reconnaissance 
operations (Cold Response 2016). Although the parties claim 
that exercises are part of routine training, there is an increased 
reliance on nuclear operations. Integrating realistic nuclear 
exercises downplays the logic of deterrence and suggests 
increases in the probabilities of use; and thus, could affect 
the nuclear calculus in crisis situations. This type of nuclear 
signaling creates conditions that could result in deliberate 
or inadvertent nuclear weapons use with catastrophic 
consequences.
The type of missiles deployed in current conflicts also 
affects the risks of nuclear confrontation. Iskandar tactical 
ballistic missiles that Russia deployed on its border in 2013 and 
the current debate on empowering the status of tactical nuclear 
 10 UK Prime Minister Theresa May on willingness to use nuclear weapons, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9ObikPwV70.
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weapons in Europe are examples that may alter decisions in a 
crisis and facilitate inadvertent or deliberate use. 
The use of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles in conflicts 
blurs the types of available responses in crisis environments. 
Cruise missiles deployed with nuclear warheads cannot be 
differentiated from conventional cruise missiles.11 Thus, 
these weapons are inherently destabilizing.12 When used, 
the recipient country would not know the nature of the attack 
until after the attack. During crises, states act best when they 
consider all options without extraordinary time pressure. 
Conversely, decision-making time to respond to nuclear-tipped 
cruise missiles is short. In a single operation, Russia launched 
twenty-six cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea to Syria; four 
of these missiles crashed on undesignated areas in Iran. Under 
other circumstances, it is clear that relying on conventionally-
armed cruise missiles that could be mistaken for nuclear-armed 
warheads would be highly dangerous.
Behavioral research indicates that states are more prone to 
take risks when they only consider the possible positive gains 
rather than the possible negative consequences of their actions. 
Nuclear calculations should incorporate the Cold War lessons 
and focus on the catastrophic impacts of nuclear weapons use 
before it is too late. 
Low consequence events, even if they are high frequency, 
are manageable—events that occur often, if they are low 
consequence, they are everyday irritants. High frequency, high 
consequence events are risks we cannot ignore and we take 
them very seriously indeed—hence all the car safety features 
that have been developed and the medical research that has 
tackled diseases such as polio, cardiovascular and cancer that 
reduce impact and probability of occurrence. 
 11 Pavel Podvig, Blurring the line between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons: 
Increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war? Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 2016, 72:3, pp. 145-149.
 12 William J. Perry and Andy Weber, “Mr. President, kill the new cruise missile”, 
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It was in this context that the Humanitarian Impacts of 
Nuclear Weapons Initiative conferences in 2013-2104 brought 
a fresh perspective to the current range of risks associated 
with nuclear weapons. This “humanitarian initiative” spawned 
studies and projects that looked again at the consequences of 
the use of nuclear weapons and what the likelihood of such 
use might be today. The attempts to ascertain the new risks 
humanity faces as a result of the continuing retention of nuclear 
weapons has resulted in new understandings about long-term 
impacts on the environment and on human health—particularly 
on women’s health and therefore the health of their children—
and on the likelihood of use as a result of understanding more 
about the number of near-accidents and near, inadvertent use 
incidents. 
These new understandings have led in turn to a sense 
of urgency on the part of participating government and non-
governmental organizations. The step-by-step process that has not 
made any tangible progress since the negotiation of the CTBT in 
1996 has run into the ground in the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) at the United Nations in Geneva. As the steps are to be taken 
chiefly by the nuclear-weapon states and other nuclear weapons 
possessors, nuclear disarmament is contingent on their political 
will and cooperation, which has not been forthcoming within 
the multilateral frameworks. Even though several governments’ 
statements suggest that the step-by-step process is still alive, it 
is hard to see how such a conclusion could be reached following 
20 years of failed attempts to begin negotiations on the “next 
step” for a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for 
weapons purposes. The mandate for these negotiations13 was 
agreed in 1995 and the inability since then to find a path to treaty 
negotiations, despite heroic efforts by so many talented diplomats, 
has led to ingrained frustration with the CD and its viscosity. As 
a result, a number of other attempts and pathways have been tried 
and two are currently under development. The first of these, a 
“legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons leading 
 13 Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon, The Shannon Report and Mandate, 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/official-and-govt-documents/shannon-
report-mandate, 24 March 1995.
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towards their total elimination”,14 has gained substantial traction 
and negotiations under the United Nations General Assembly 
will begin in 2017. The idea of a legally binding instrument 
is to reduce and eliminate the risks of nuclear weapons use and 
to prohibit nuclear weapons—their possession, development, 
deployment, stockpiling and use for all. Most countries have 
already committed to these measures through their obligations 
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—in order to pave the 
way for further nuclear disarmament. 
The second approach, which is less of a departure from 
current practice, is to adapt the step-by-step approach into 
a more fluid “progressive approach” in which the steps are 
no longer in any sequence and new steps, such as de-alerting 
measures, might be introduced.15 
Whatever the outcome of these new attempts to address 
the hard-to-crack problem of nuclear weapons, clearly there are 
new concerns and new dangers. Experts may like to imagine that 
a nuclear conflict “would never happen” but it would be foolish 
to imagine that to be true. The human race has had far too much 
experience lately of devastating events that are considered 
highly unlikely to occur—catastrophic earthquakes, tsunamis, 
floods, fires, meteor explosions, nuclear reactor meltdowns 
and so on—for people to believe that a war that included the 
deliberate, inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear weapons is 
impossible. Complacency in regard to nuclear weapons—when 
so many are on high alert and belong to countries in conflict 
and when this is a man-made problem with a range of workable 
solutions—is hard to fathom and, should nuclear weapons ever 
be detonated again in conflict, would be hard to forgive. 
 14 United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/258 of 23 December 
2016, General and Complete Disarmament: taking forward multilateral 
nuclear disarmament negotiations.
 15 United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group Taking 
Forward Bilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, 24 February 
2016, A/AC.286/WP.9. See also, George Perkovich, Patricia Lewis, The 
Vantage Point, International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament, January 2009.
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Climate disruption and global famine: Nuclear 
weapons impact on the environment 
Ira Helfand, MD
During the Cold War, the enormous arsenals of nuclear 
weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet 
Union were capable of catastrophic destruction on a global 
scale. A US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study of 
the medical consequences of nuclear war concluded that, in 
a large scale nuclear conflict, several hundred million people 
would die directly and the subsequent famine would lead to 
the death of one to four billion people, most the of the earth’s 
population at that time. 
The study highlighted a key insight: “the primary 
mechanisms for human fatalities would likely not be from 
blast effects, not from thermal radiation burns, and not from 
ionizing radiation, but, rather, from mass starvation.”1 Climate 
disruption, and the resulting disruption of food production 
worldwide would kill far more people than the direct effects of 
the nuclear explosions themselves. 
With the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic 
decline in the number of nuclear warheads in the world. But 
the weapons remaining are still able to produce catastrophic 
humanitarian impacts. A 2002 study of the direct effects of 
a nuclear war involving post Cold War forces in the US and 
Russian arsenals showed that if only 300 Russian warheads 
got through to urban targets in the United States, 75 to 100 
million people would be killed directly by the explosions, fires 
 1 Harwell, M., Harwell, C., 1986: “Nuclear Famine: The Indirect Effects 
of Nuclear War.” In, Solomon, F., Marston, R. (eds.) The Medical 
Implications of Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, pp. 117-35.
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and radiation, and the entire economic infrastructure on which 
the rest of the population depended would be destroyed.2 A US 
attack on Russian cities would produce similar results. 
However, as suggested by the NAS study, these direct 
fatalities would constitute only a small portion of the total 
death toll. Recent climate studies have confirmed that even the 
reduced number of weapons remaining in the US and Russian 
arsenals can produce a nuclear winter, and they have shown 
that this catastrophic global cooling will persist for more than 
a decade. A conflict involving only those weapons that will still 
be allowed to the US and Russia when the New START treaty 
is fully implemented could inject some 150 million tons of 
soot into the upper atmosphere dropping temperatures around 
the world an average of 8°C. In the interior regions of North 
America and Eurasia, temperatures would drop 25° to 30°C.3,4 
In the temperate regions of the Northern Hemisphere, there 
would be two to three years without a single day free of frost—
the temperature would drop below freezing for some portion of 
every day. Under these conditions ecosystems would collapse 
and food production would halt. The vast majority of the human 
population would starve and it is possible we could become 
extinct as a species. 
It would not require a full-scale nuclear war between the 
United States and Russia to cause catastrophic humanitarian 
impacts around the world. A more limited war between the 
nuclear superpowers, or a war between smaller nuclear powers, 
such as India and Pakistan, would also cause catastrophic 
regional effects, worldwide climate disruption, and staggering 
numbers of fatalities potentially threatening the survival of 
human civilization. These enormous global consequences of a 
 2 Helfand, I., Forrow, L., McCally, M., Musil, R., 2002: “Projected US 
Casualties and Destruction of US Medical Services From Attacks by 
Russian Nuclear Forces,” Medicine and Global Survival, 7, 68-76.
 3 Robock, A., Oman, L., Stenchikov, G., 2007: “Nuclear winter revisited 
with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still 
catastrophic consequences,” J. Geophys. Res.,112, D13107.
 4 Toon, O., Robock, A., Turco, R., 2008: “Environmental consequences of 
nuclear war,” Physics Today, 61, No. 12, 37-42.
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limited regional nuclear war are less widely understood than the 
effects of a larger nuclear war and deserve to be considered in 
some detail. 
In 2007, a study by Toon et al. examined the effects of a 
“limited” regional nuclear war, using the example of India and 
Pakistan and assuming the use of only 100 Hiroshima-sized 
bombs, or less than 0.03% of the world’s nuclear arsenal, 
targeted on urban areas. They found that up to 21 million 
people could be killed directly by the explosions, fires, and 
local radiation and that the conflict would loft up to 6.6 Tg 
(6.6 teragrams or 6.6 million metric tons) of black carbon 
aerosol particles into the upper troposphere.5 
Robock et al. then calculated the effect that this injection 
of soot would have on global climate, assuming a war in South 
Asia occurring in mid-May. Their study employed a conservative 
figure of only 5 Tg of black carbon particles. They found 
that, “A global average surface cooling of −1.25°C persists 
for years, and after a decade the cooling is still −0.50°C. The 
temperature changes are largest over land. A cooling of several 
degrees occurs over large areas of North America and Eurasia, 
including most of the grain-growing regions.” In addition the 
study found significant declines in global precipitation with 
marked decreases in rainfall in the most important temperate 
grain-growing regions of North America and Eurasia, and a 
large reduction in the Asian summer monsoon.6
Two additional studies, one by Stenke et al., and the other 
by Mills et al., each using a different climate model, have also 
 5 Toon, O., Turco, R., Robock, A., Bardeen, C., Oman, L., Stenchikov, G., 
2007: “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale 
nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” Atm. Chem. 
Phys., 7, 1973-2002.
 6 Robock, A., Oman, L., Stenchikov, G., Toon, O., Bardeen, C., Turco, R., 
2007a: “Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts,” Atm. 
Chem. Phys., 7, 2003-2012.
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examined the impact on global climate of this limited nuclear 
war scenario and they have both found comparable effects.7,8
A number of studies have subsequently attempted to 
estimate the impact this climate change would have on food 
production. 
Ozdogan et al.9 examined the impact on corn and soybean 
production in the US Corn Belt, where more than 70% of US 
grain is produced. The calculated change in crop yield was 
based on the decline in precipitation, solar radiation, growing 
season length, and average monthly temperature predicted in 
Robock’s study. 
The calculations in this study are probably conservative, 
as the study did not consider two other environmental factors, 
which would be expected to produce a further significant 
decline in yield. It did not factor in the increase in UV light 
secondary to ozone depletion, and, perhaps more importantly, it 
did not consider daily temperature extremes, which may lead to 
complete crop failure. 
Despite this conservative bias, the study shows very 
significant declines in both corn and soybean production. 
Averaged over 10 years, corn production would decline by 10% 
at all four sites. But there would be a great deal of variation 
from year to year, and losses would be most severe in year 5, 
averaging more than 20%. For soybeans the decline in 
production would be about 7%. Again, the losses would be most 
severe in year 5, averaging more than 20%.
In a separate study, Xia and Robock10 examined the decline 
in Chinese middle season rice production in response to this 
 7 See http://www.atmos-chem-phys-discuss.net/13/12089/2013/acpd-13-
12089-2013.html.
 8 Mills, M., Toon, O., Taylor, J., Robock, A., 2014: “Multi-decadal global 
cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear 
conflict,” Earth’s Future, 2, 161-176.
 9 Ozdogan, M., Robock, A., and Kucharik, C., 2013: “Consequences of a 
regional nuclear conflict for crop production in the Midwestern United 
States,” Climatic Change, 116, 373-387
 10 Xia, L., Robock, A., 2013:” Impacts of a nuclear war in South Asia on 
rice production in mainland China,” Climatic Change, 116, 357-372.
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5 Tg event. This study used a different crop model, which also 
considered changes in monthly precipitation, solar radiation and 
temperature. Like Ozdogan’s study it did not consider the effect 
of UV light increases or daily temperature extremes, or the 
possible decline in available fertilizer, pesticide and gasoline. 
Again, despite this conservative bias, the study showed a 
significant decline in Chinese middle season rice production. 
Averaged over 10 years, the shortfall would be 15.1 million 
metric tons per year, about 12% of the total crop. In the case of 
Chinese rice production, the decline would be most severe in 
the first 3 years. 
The impact on rice production was found to vary widely 
by province. In some areas in the South and East of China, 
production would actually rise. For example, in Hainan, rice 
yield would increase by 5% to 15% per year.
In other areas to the North and West, the decline would 
be much more severe than the national average. In heavily 
populated Sichuan, the decline would average about 50% over 
the ten-year period and in the first two years after the war it 
would be greater than 60%, rising to a 90% decrease in the 3rd 
year. These regional variations would, at the very least, cause 
severe distribution problems. 
In a follow up 2013 study, Xia, Robock and their 
colleagues looked at the impact of the climate change on 
rice, maize and, wheat production in China following limited 
nuclear war.11 For this study, they used the 2007 climate change 
projections by Robock et al. that were used in the earlier 
studies of US maize and Chinese rice production, and also the 
subsequent climate projections of Stenke et al. and Mills et al. 
There were some variations in the crop outputs found using 
the different climate models, but they all showed significant 
declines in crop size. For maize, the average decline was about 
16% over a full decade. For middle season rice, the projected 
decline was somewhat larger than in their earlier estimates: 20% 
 11 Xia, L., Robock, A., Mills, M., Stenke, A., Helfand, I., 2015: “Decadal 
reduction of Chinese agriculture after a regional nuclear war,” Earth’s 
Future, 3, 37-48.
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for the first 5 years and 17% over the course of 10 years. The 
most disturbing new projection related to the Chinese winter 
wheat crop, which is usually just a little bit smaller than middle 
season rice crop. The effect on winter wheat was much more 
severe, averaging about 39% for the first 5 years and 31% for 
a full decade. In the first year, the projected decline in winter 
wheat was more than 50%.
Declines in food production of the magnitude suggested by 
these studies would have a major impact on human nutrition. 
As of September 2016, the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization estimated that world grain reserves would be 664 
million metric tons in 2017. Expressed as days of consumption, 
this reserve would last for only 92 days.12 Furthermore, the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates 
that in 2016 there are 795 million people in the world who 
already suffer from malnutrition.13 
Given this precarious situation, even small further declines 
in food production could have major consequences. The large 
and protracted declines in agricultural output predicted by 
Ozdogan and Xia are unprecedented in modern times, and the 
full extent of their impact on human nutrition are difficult to 
predict.
Normally a decline in agricultural production affects 
food consumption by raising the cost of food; the decline in 
“accessible” food, the amount of food that people can afford to 
buy, is much greater than the decline in “available” food, the 
actual agricultural output. The impact of rising food prices is, 
of course, felt disproportionately by people who are already 
malnourished precisely because they cannot, at baseline prices, 
afford to buy enough food.
At the time of the great Bengal famine of 1943, during 
which three million people died, food production was only 
5% less than it had been on average over the preceding five 
years, and it was actually 13% higher than it had been in 1941 
 12 See http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/csdb/en/.
 13 See https://www.wfp.org/hunger/stats.
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when there was not a famine. But in 1943, after the Japanese 
occupation of Burma, which had historically exported grain to 
Bengal, the decline in food production was coupled with panic 
hoarding and the price of rice increased nearly five fold, making 
food unaffordable to large numbers of people.14 These two 
factors, hoarding and the severe increase in rice prices, caused 
an effective inaccessibility of food far more severe than the 
actual shortfall in production.
We would have to expect panic on a far greater scale 
following a nuclear war even if it were a “limited” regional war, 
especially as it became clear that there would be significant, 
sustained agricultural shortfalls over an extended period. 
It is probable that there would be hoarding on an 
international scale as food exporting nations suspend exports in 
order to assure adequate food supplies for their own populations. 
In the last decade and a half there have been a number of 
examples of nations banning grain exports. In September 
2002, Canada, faced with a sharp decline in wheat production 
because of drought conditions, suspended wheat exports for a 
year. The next year, the European Union took similar action, 
as did Russia. And in August 2004 Vietnam indicated it would 
not export rice until the following spring.15 India banned rice 
exports in November 2007, which, followed by restrictions 
on rice export in Vietnam, Egypt, and China in January 2008, 
contributed to historic increases in world rice prices. In 2010, 
Russia, responding to the severe drought conditions that year 
again suspended grain exports.16 In the event of a regional 
nuclear war, the grain exporting states would be faced with 
major crop losses and the prospect of bad harvests for the next 
several years. It is probable that they would take similar action, 
and refuse to export whatever grain surplus they might have, 
retaining it instead as a domestic reserve. It is also probable that 
there would be widespread speculation on agricultural markets. 
 14 Sen, A., Poverty and famines. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981.
 15 Brown, L., 2010: Outgrowing the Earth. New York: WW Norton & Co.
 16 Khrennikov, I., 2010: “Medvedev orders review of Russian grain export 
ban at harvest end.” See http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-04/
medvedev-orders-review-of-russia-grain-export-ban-at-harvest-end.html.
23
Civil Society Engagement in Disarmament Processes
Even if we do not take into account the way that rising 
food prices exacerbate the effects of a fall in food production, 
the declines in available food predicted by Ozdogan and Xia 
would be devastating. 
For the 795 million people who are currently 
malnourished, the majority of their caloric intake is derived 
from grain. For example, in Bangladesh the figure is about 78%. 
We cannot know with certainty that a 10%-20% decline in grain 
production would translate directly into a 10%-20% decline 
in grain consumption for all 795 million. For example, some 
of the malnourished are subsistence farmers who live in areas 
where grain production might not decline. But we do know 
that the chronically malnourished cannot survive a significant, 
sustained further decline in their caloric intake. With a baseline 
consumption of 1,750 calories per day, even a 10% decline 
would lead to an additional deficit of 175 calories per day. 
While many of the malnourished might survive the first year, it 
is realistic to fear that they would not survive if these conditions 
persisted for a decade. 
The agricultural disruption caused by a limited nuclear 
war would also pose a threat to the several hundred million 
people who enjoy adequate nutrition at this time, but who live 
in countries that are dependent on food imports. The nations 
of North Africa, home to more than 150 million, people import 
more than 45% of their food.17 Malaysia, South Korea, Japan 
and Taiwan, as well as a number of countries in the Middle East, 
import 50% or more of their grain.18 The anticipated suspension 
of exports from grain growing countries might cause severe 
effects on nutrition in all of these countries. The wealthier 
among them might initially be able to obtain grain by bidding 
up the price on international markets, but as the extent and 
duration of the crop losses became clear, exporting countries 
would probably tighten their bans on exports threatening the 
food supplies of all these importing countries.
 17 See www.ers.usda.gov/publications/gfa16/GFA16CountryTablesNAfrca.
xls.
 18 See www.iucn.org/themes/wani/eatlas/html/gm19.html.
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In addition, there are some 1 billion people in China who 
have not shared in the economic growth of the last three decades 
and would have great difficulty buying food given the major 
shortfalls in Chinese food production that are projected.
Combined with the 795 million people who are currently 
malnourished, and the populations of food importing countries, 
this would place the number of people potentially threatened by 
famine at well over two billion.
Two other issues need to be considered as well. First, there 
is a very high likelihood that famine on this scale would lead to 
major epidemics of infectious diseases. The prolonged cooling 
and resultant famine in 536-545 AD was accompanied by a 
major outbreak of plague, which developed over the next half 
century into a global pandemic.19 The famine of 1816 triggered 
an epidemic of typhus in Ireland that spread to much of Europe20 
and the famine conditions in India that year led to an outbreak 
of cholera that has been implicated in the first global cholera 
pandemic.21 The well-studied Great Bengal Famine of 1943 
was associated with major local epidemics of cholera, malaria, 
smallpox and dysentery.22
Despite the advances in medical technology of the last 
half century, a global famine on the scale anticipated would 
provide the ideal breeding ground for epidemics involving 
any or all of these illnesses. In particular, the vast megacities 
of the developing world, crowded, and often lacking adequate 
sanitation in the best of times, would almost certainly see major 
outbreaks of infectious diseases; and illnesses, like plague, 
which have not been prevalent in recent years, might again 
become major health threats. 
Finally we need to consider the immense potential for 
war and civil conflict that would be created by famine on this 
 19 Keys, D., Catastrophe. London: Century. 1999.
 20 Stommel, H., Volcano weather: The story of 1816, the year without a 
summer. Newport, Rhode Island: Seven Seas Press. 1983.
 21 Stommel, H., Stommel, E., 1979: “The year without a summer”. Scientific 
American. 240:176-1869
 22 Sen. op. cit.
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scale. Within nations where famine is widespread there would 
almost certainly be food riots, and competition for limited food 
resources might well exacerbate ethnic and regional animosities. 
Among nations, armed conflict is a very real possibility as 
states dependent on imports attempt to maintain access to food 
supplies.
It is impossible to estimate the additional global death toll 
from disease and further warfare that this “limited regional” 
nuclear war might cause, but, given the world-wide scope of the 
climate effects, the dead from these causes might well number 
in the hundreds of millions.
Conclusion
The newly generated data on the decline in agricultural 
production that would follow a limited, regional nuclear war 
in South Asia support the concern that more than two billion 
people would be in danger of starvation. Epidemic disease and 
further conflict spawned by such a famine would put additional 
hundreds of millions at risk. Death on this scale would not 
mean the extinction of our species, but it would almost certainly 
mean the end of modern industrial civilization. No civilization 
in human history has withstood a shock of this magnitude and 
there is no reason to expect that ours would either. 
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Human consequences of radiation: A gender 
factor in atomic harm
Mary Olson
Ionizing radiation,1 no matter the source and no matter 
the amount, can harm living organisms. While living on Earth 
entails exposure to naturally occurring radiation, something 
new began with the dawn of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons include harmful impacts from 
the ionizing radiation they release.
Nuclear weapons kill immediately with heat and blast. 
Nuclear war’s largest near-term death toll would be from famine 
as a result of climate disruption.2 Any nuclear explosion also 
emits ionizing radiation so intense that bodies are literally 
cooked if not shielded. Ionizing radiation exposures may also 
burn and produce the syndrome called “radiation sickness”. 
Yet, even a single radioactive emission, so small it cannot be 
detected, may strike a living cell; over time, the resulting 
damage may become a fatal cancer.3 Therefore, regulators 
acknowledge that there is no safe radiation exposure-level 
above zero. 
The fundamentals about radiation bring the obligation to 
extend the findings in this paper on gender to people suffering 
chronic, lower levels of exposure from the weapons-uranium 
 1 Energy and particles emitted from the nucleus of an unstable atom when 
in contact with living tissue may knock an electron off of a molecule, 
producing a charged ion; thus “ionizing” radiation. Ionization is only 
one type of impact that radioactivity (particles and rays) may produce in 
living cells.
 2 See the article in this publication by Ira Helfand, entitled “Climate 
disruption and global famine: Nuclear weapons impact on the 
environment” on p. 16.
 3 Dr. Helen Caldicott, 1994, Nuclear Madness, WW Norton and Co.
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fuel chain, plutonium production and processing as well as the 
wastes and residues from making and testing nuclear weapons. 
The regulations in place today do not reflect the findings here. 
Nuclear-weapon fuel production, processing, testing and 
the use of nuclear weapons have already poisoned soils, waters 
and workers, scattering radioactive fission products far and 
wide. Biologically harmful radioactive particles mix into rain in 
the clouds, falling into rivers and fields, then sucked up by crops 
and eaten by grazing livestock, thereby exposing the general 
population including people of all ages to ionizing radiation. 
Regulation of public radiation exposure is deeply rooted 
in the atomic history of the 20th century. The development of 
nuclear weapons involved sending large numbers of military 
and paramilitary personnel into areas that were restricted to the 
general public. The first regulations were naturally based on these 
people, primarily male, all adult. The attempt to limit radiation 
exposure among this group gave rise to the “Standard Man” 
metric, a set of body parameters that was adopted by regulators, 
along with a specified age, ethnicity and lifestyle,4 collectively 
referred to as the “Reference Man”.5 There is no documentation 
of an evaluation or policy review to determine whether it was 
appropriate to extend this same regulatory basis, using Reference 
Man, to the general population; it was simply done.
Seventy-five years of this uncontrolled, worldwide 
experiment of mixing fission products and Life, has produced 
results that are chaotic. Cancers do not appear immediately6 and 
when they arrive, they rarely bear a tag announcing the cause. 
 4 Reference Man is used by the International Committee for Radiological 
Protection, and its antecedents in nations around the world. The official 
definition as adopted in 1974 is posted by the Institute for Energy 
and Environmental Research here: http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2009/01/definition-of-reference-man.pdf.
 5 As of January 30, 2017, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
“Standards for Protection Against Radiation” US Code of Federal 
Regulations Chapter 10, Part 20 include 8 separate references to 
“Reference Man” including the definition of “annual allowable intake” 
for radionuclides.
 6 Cancer arises from damage to cells. Often the damage sits for years and 
even decades, known as the “latency period”. In the case of childhood 
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It took 60+ years after the first radiation exposures from 
nuclear weapons for the public to ask: “Is harm from ionizing 
radiation uniform across the human7 lifecycle?” and “Are age 
and gender factors in harm caused by ionizing radiation?” And 
specifically, “Is there a Gender Factor in the degree of harm 
from a fixed level of ionizing radiation exposure?”
In order to address questions like these with respect to 
long-term consequences like cancer, it is necessary to look at 
a very large population to find a “signal in the noise” of data. 
Even more fundamental is that the data-set must itself include 
all ages and both genders to find an answer to questions on 
the disproportionate impact of ionizing radiation tied to age 
and gender. There is only one such body of data that has been 
published: the Lifespan Study of the A-Bomb Survivors of the 
1945 nuclear attack by the United States on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Japan. 
In 1949 the United States sent researchers to study the 
people who survived the A-Bombs, the hibakusha. These 
American researchers offered no treatment or other medical 
assistance. 
From the A-Bomb survivors we now know: gender 
and age matter, greatly, in the outcome of ionizing radiation 
exposure. Because gender and age have not been factored into 
official evaluations of radiation impacts to date, harm to human 
populations has been systematically under-estimated and under 
reported even while ionizing radiation has spread world-wide.
The following are findings of a simple numerical analysis 
of the gender and age aspects of the A-Bomb Survivor Lifespan 
Study data as published in 2006 by the (US) National Academy 
of Science (NAS).8 All the data collection was performed by the 
cancer, the damage may have been done either prior to birth, or, even 
prior to conception in radiation exposure to either parent.
 7 This paper does not address issues of reproduction, or barriers to it. The 
term “human lifecycle” here refers to males and females between birth 
and death.
 8 NAS 2006. Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation [BEIR VII, Phase 
Two] posted on-line: https://www.nap.edu/read/11340/chapter/1#v and for 
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Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, and later the Radiation 
Effects Research Foundation. NAS compiled and reported the 
population data. The data is gender-disaggregated, but the NAS 
authors do not present a gender analysis. 
The data published in 2006 is unique. The survivors of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were grouped by the age they were at 
the time of the bombing. These groups were tracked over their 
lifetimes. Cancers and cancer deaths were counted. More than 
100,000 survivors form the data-set, people of all ages and both 
genders, tracked for 60 years.
We can broadly say that those who were five years or 
younger in August 1945 were most likely to suffer cancer at 
some point in their lives. 
Taking a fixed exposure level and then comparing the age 
of exposure in each biological gender, we see that young girls 
(birth to age 5) were twice as likely to get cancer as boys in the 
same age cohort. 
Graph 1
Age at exposure
Data Source: U.S. National Academy of Sciences BEIR VII Phase 2 Risk Model
download as PDF (with sign-in) https://www.nap.edu/login.php?record_
id=11340&page=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nap.edu%2Fdownload%2F11340.
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For every male in the birth-to-5 years cohort that suffered 
cancer at some point in their lives, two females got cancer. 
Figure 1
The cancers caused by radiation exposure in childhood do not 
all appear in childhood; indeed the harm is expressed across the 
lifetime. 
For those who were adults in 1945, there is also a gender 
factor. Over their lifetime, women exposed to radiation as adults 
suffered 50% more cancer: for every two men in the age cohort 
who died of cancer, three women died of cancer. 
Figure 2
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These ratios of impact—double the likelihood of harm to 
girls compared to boys and a 50% higher likelihood of harm to 
women compared to men—are deeply meaningful to women. It 
is very important to note that ionizing radiation can cause harm 
in males, and that it is more likely to cause harm in females.
Graph 1 is a snapshot of the human cancer-response to a 
fixed level of ionizing radiation exposure. It clearly shows that 
adult males are harmed by ionizing radiation, and also that they 
are the least harmed. 
Cancer rates in the cohort of females who were exposed 
when they were aged birth-to-5, are almost 10 times higher than 
the rate of cancer in the cohort of males who were 30 years 
old, the age of the Reference Man, in August 1945. This is a 
difference that is nearly a full order of magnitude. 
Graph 2
Age at exposure
Data Source: U.S. National Academy of Sciences BEIR VII Phase 2 Risk Model
Radiation harm to males is also underestimated when only 
the adult male is considered. As can be seen in Graphs 1 and 
2, cancer resulting from radiation exposure to boys (birth-to-5 
years) is five-times higher than the rate for 30-year-old men. 
The Reference Man does not represent the harm to males across 
their lifespan. 
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Gender and age, particularly when combined, are potent 
factors influencing the outcome of radiation exposure. This 
disproportionate harm to children and females is currently 
invisible to decision-makers. These insights, garnered from 
the lives of the Japanese A-Bomb survivors, change our 
understanding of the humanitarian consequences of making, 
testing and using nuclear weapons and, indeed, any exposure to 
ionizing radiation.
Now we can say: radiation exposure is not “one-size-fits 
all”. In order to gauge possible harm from radiation, one must 
also know the age at the time of exposure, and the biological 
gender of those exposed. “Traditional” analytical methods for 
assessing radiological harm result in a serious underestimation 
of real suffering and societal cost. 
Further inquiry is required in order to understand the 
biological basis of disproportionate harm to females from 
radiation exposure, but in the context of the development, 
testing and use of nuclear weapons that has resulted in broad 
distribution of fission products and subsequent exposure to 
the general population, the information we have now points to 
clear humanitarian consequences that can only be prevented by 
elimination of nuclear weapons and the industrial base upon 
which they rest. 
The Principle of Precaution urges protective action be 
taken now, before (and during) further research. Women and 
children require greater protection from ionizing radiation than 
is currently afforded to them. Protection and prevention of 
unnecessary radiation exposures, particularly in early childhood, 
will contribute to greater health now and in the future. The 
gender factor in harm due to ionizing radiation raises a moral 
dimension that has not been considered before in decisions 
related to the continued stockpiling, production, testing and 
the ongoing possibility of use of nuclear weapons. In addition, 
the regulation of radiation, rooted as it is in the Manhattan 
Project and the Cold War, must also be updated worldwide, or 
risk perpetuating the same humanitarian consequences, albeit 
primarily at a chronic rather than acute level of exposure.
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There are many locations today where children are born 
into contaminated environments. In such areas, over time, the 
populations become composed of people who were all exposed 
as children. The data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki tell us that 
radiation exposure in early childhood will extend across the 
lifetime as a higher likelihood of cancer. Cancer is not the only 
outcome of radiation exposure; it is the one that the researchers 
tracking the A-Bomb survivors focused on.
Other questions must also be addressed: 
• Is there a gender factor in harm from internalized 
radioactivity? Internalized radionuclides release charged 
particles and energy waves inside the body, directly to 
tissue. These originate from the contaminated biome 
where inhalation and ingestion of radioactivity is nearly 
unavoidable. The A-Bomb Survivor Lifespan Study 
is based on a single, acute exposure to a large group; 
“excess” cancers in that population are studied in relation 
to that shared event. The data-set does not afford analysis 
of biological gender or age with respect to internalized 
radiation. Certainly these questions must be asked, and 
answered.
• The A-Bomb Survivor Lifespan Study includes only those 
who survived the first 4-5 years after the bombs. The 
survivors made it, against all odds, to be alive when the 
study began. Those who were lost in the first years likely 
included people more sensitive to radiation. There is also 
no data on radiological impacts on the development and 
viability of embryo, fetus and birth. 
Conclusion
Ignorance of the disproportionate impacts of ionizing 
radiation across the human lifecycle have resulted in 
underestimation of the radiological consequences of the 
production, testing and use of nuclear weapons. Humanitarian 
action is needed to redress the many injustices and health 
consequences that are unfolding in the wake of the decision to 
utilize nuclear explosions on our planet.
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It is time to heed the teachings in the atomic ashes 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—ionizing radiation inflicts 
disproportionate harm on children, and girls are twice as likely 
to suffer than boys. Harm inflicted in childhood persists over 
the lifetime9 and is expressed as disease (cancer) in adulthood. 
There is a gender difference in cancer-rates from a fixed dose of 
radiation, no matter the age of exposure. In adults the difference 
is less marked than in children, but still measurable even in 
elders. 
This evidence about radiation harm must now be applied 
in a reevaluation of relevant policies. The use of a Reference 
Man in radiation regulation must end. Finding these patterns 
does not make them new. Seventy-five years of underestimation 
of radiation harm resulting from the exclusive use of data 
and assumptions based on adult males should be evaluated in 
terms of the hidden humanitarian costs of the nuclear weapons 
arsenals. Humanitarian principles require that children and 
women be fully considered and appropriately protected. 
We do not yet know what causes biological gender to 
change the outcome of exposure to radiation, but clearly that is 
a question worthy of an answer. A humanitarian response is first 
to protect and prevent, and then to study and change polices to 
reflect these realities. The harm is not invisible. It is society that 
has been blind.
 9 See endnote xiii, Olson, and unpublished draft of paper for GS10 (May 
2017, Tokyo Japan).
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Banning the bomb: From 1950s activism to the 
General Assembly via Greenham Common
Rebecca Johnson, PhD
The 1950s slogan “Ban the Bomb” was given new purpose 
on 27 October 2016 when 123 United Nations Member States 
voted in the First Committee for draft resolution “L.41”1 on 
“Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, 
thereby agreeing to start negotiations in 2017 on “a legally 
binding treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards 
their total elimination”. More than 71 years since two atomic 
bombs destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, 
the world stands on the threshold of banning nuclear weapons. 
Drawing lessons from history, this chapter looks at early efforts 
to ban nuclear testing, the networked humanitarian campaigning 
in the 1980s that brought about the 1987 Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, with particular emphasis on the 
Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp, and the growing 
international campaign to ban nuclear weapons (2010 to the 
present). 
There have been three notable surges in nuclear 
disarmament activism: the 1950s, when governments and civil 
society pushed for the global step of a Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the 1980s, when opposition to new 
types of nuclear missiles inspired the development of new forms 
of non-violent, feminist and ecological campaigning that led 
from the interim demand to ban a particular class of nuclear 
war-fighting weapons to interrelated campaigns against all 
forms of patriarchal violence and oppression; and the post-2010 
humanitarian initiatives to prohibit all nuclear weapons as the 
 1 This draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 
71/258 on 23 December 2016. 
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next feasible step to build stronger norms and conditions for 
effective disarmament and non-nuclear security, leading to the 
irreversible elimination of all nuclear arsenals. 
The 1950s Ban-the-Bomb campaigns developed in 
reaction to the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the 
contaminating mushroom clouds that punctuated the escalating 
nuclear rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Movements were mainly initiated in the West, led by scientists, 
left-leaning political groupings and peace organizations. 
Pugwash and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (custodians 
of the “doomsday clock”) started at this time. The Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF, founded 
in 1915) networked across the world to bridge East-West 
divides, and were instrumental in the 1961 United States 
Women’s Strike for Peace that is credited with influencing the 
Kennedy Administration to pursue a nuclear weapons test ban. 
The United Kingdom’s Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) was founded in 1958 after Britain joined 
the United States–Soviet nuclear club with a series of nuclear 
tests in Australia and the Pacific. CND organized widely-
supported public marches between London and the Aldermaston 
atomic weapons factory 50 miles away, in close cooperation 
with the Committee of 100 which encouraged sit-downs and 
blockades of nuclear facilities. CND’s logo,2 designed by Gerald 
Holtom to depict the semaphore signals for N (nuclear) and 
D (disarmament) contained in a circle (symbolizing birth and 
life), remains a potent peace symbol, familiar across the world.
Soon after France joined the nuclear club in 1960, and 
less than a year after the Cuban Missile Crisis, United States, 
Soviet and British leaders abandoned efforts to achieve a 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and settled 
for the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which prohibited 
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, underwater and outer 
space. Five years later, after China had begun nuclear testing 
and several others had embarked on national nuclear weapons 
programmes, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was 
 2 See http://www.cnduk.org/about/item/435-the-cnd-symbol.
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concluded. This did not prohibit nuclear weapons, but enshrined 
a weakly worded “good faith” obligation in Article VI to pursue 
nuclear disarmament negotiations. 
The NPT was essentially an agreement to close the 
proliferation door to those who had not yet crossed the 
threshold. It created a special category defined as “nuclear-
weapon States” (NWS), encompassing the five States that 
also enjoyed permanent seats on the United Nations Security 
Council.3 The NWS’ obligations focused mainly on not 
transferring weapons or their technologies, with no verification 
requirements, contrasting starkly with the explicit undertakings 
required from non-nuclear governments not to acquire, 
manufacture or receive assistance or technology to develop 
nuclear weapons. In addition to its nonproliferation provisions 
in Articles I to III, the NPT encouraged developments in nuclear 
technologies for “peaceful purposes” and permitted “peaceful 
nuclear explosions” in Articles IV and V. Regarded as the 
most that could be achieved in the cold war 1960s, the PTBT 
and NPT were partial agreements at best. Though presented 
as steps to disarmament, their overriding purpose was to 
safeguard the perceived advantages and military-technological 
interests of the major nuclear possessors. Though the treaties’ 
preambles contained aspirations and desires to prevent further 
environmental contamination, human devastation and nuclear 
war, it soon became apparent that disarmament was being 
displaced by “nonproliferation” as a viable goal. Non-nuclear 
nations and civil society made efforts to emphasize that 
disarmament and nonproliferation were two sides of the same 
coin, and to equate “vertical proliferation”—the growth and 
modernization of nuclear arsenals—with the spread of nuclear 
weapons horizontally (to further States).4 Nonetheless, the 
structure of the NPT and powerful interests involved in the 
nuclear-military establishments of defined NWS ensured that 
arms control and nonproliferation were framed as “realist” 
 3 China, France, Soviet Union (later Russia), United Kingdom and United 
States of America. 
 4 See Rebecca Johnson, Unfinished Business: The negotiation of the CTBT 
and the end of nuclear testing (UNIDIR 2009).
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practical endeavours, while real disarmament, meaning the 
prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and not just the 
management of lower numbers, was dismissed as an idealist and 
utopian “ultimate goal” in the never-never land of world peace 
and total harmony. 
The Viet Nam War and the reduced visibility of the nuclear 
arms race after 1967 contributed to the waning of nuclear 
disarmament activism. Détente in the 1970s enabled bilateral 
United States–Soviet treaties that partially limited strategic 
offensive missiles, anti-ballistic missiles and the permitted size 
of underground nuclear testing. These arms control agreements 
facilitated the management of nuclear arsenals, as well as the 
cold war relationship, while underscoring the power relations 
that allowed the five NWS to carry on designing and producing 
new types of nuclear weapons. 
This convenient arrangement was fundamentally 
challenged in the 1980s. The catalyst was Moscow’s forward 
deployment of SS20 missiles, which NATO met with a decision 
on 12 December 1979 to deploy a new generation of state of 
the art intermediate-range cruise and pershing missiles, starting 
with the United States Air Force base at Greenham Common, 
60 miles west of London.5 Others would be deployed in 
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.
These deployments of weapons seemed more suited to 
first-use decapitation strikes than the mega bombs associated 
with mutual assured destruction (MAD) “deterrence” doctrines. 
As such, they were viewed as a dangerous escalation likely 
to exacerbate United States–Soviet hostilities and undermine 
crisis instability. From United States Generals to people in 
supermarkets, there was talk of a nuclear “third world war”. As 
several governments distributed civil defence advice, such as the 
United Kingdom’s notorious “Protect and Survive” pamphlet, 
the stage was set for a resurgence of disarmament action. 
 5 Greenham Common was nominally a Royal Air Force base, requisitioned 
during the 1939-45 War, and then leased for use as a nuclear base by 
the United States Air Force. See David Fairhall, The Story of Greenham 
Common Ground, IB Tauris, 2006.
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Protesters demonstrated across Europe, while an unprecedented 
million marchers were mobilized in June 1982 by the SANE-
FREEZE coalition, which called for a freeze on existing United 
States and Soviet nuclear arsenals pending further strategic 
arms reductions. 
This period saw the re-energizing of established 
organizations like Pugwash and CND as well as the emergence 
of professional groups like the European Nuclear Disarmament 
(END) network and the International Physicians for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War, which won the 1985 Nobel Peace 
Prize for its joint leadership by both American and Soviet 
doctors to highlight the shared humanitarian consequences 
of nuclear war. Most significantly, however, was the new 
generation that rose up and challenged the nuclear-military 
establishments that made ever more nuclear weapon types to 
fuel continuing political rivalries and keep control of the world 
through their “balance of terror”.
The Greenham experience epitomized how feminist and 
ecological politics synthesized the analytical understanding that 
“the personal is political”, and expanded the ways in which civil 
society in many countries challenged militarism, from Europe to 
the Pacific and beyond. For these feminist activists, militarism 
is the armed wing of patriarchy and both must be dismantled. 
Grassroots and women’s groups networked around the world, 
setting up peace camps at military bases and campaigning 
against a spectrum of nuclear-military threats. From nuclear 
testing to weapons deployments, activists highlighted not 
only the environmental and war risks, but also the connected 
violations of human rights, calling for non-alignment from the 
NATO and Warsaw military blocs in Europe and for the Pacific 
to be made nuclear free and independent. 
Across the world, feminist challenges increased the 
participation of women, insisting that leadership needed to be 
more representative and shared. Lessons, ideas and inspiration 
were drawn from many places and woven into webs that 
connected people from many cultures and ethnic heritages across 
the world in collective endeavours for disarmament, justice 
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and peace. The Greenham Women’s Peace Camp, for example, 
developed out of a walk from Cardiff to Greenham in August 
1981 organized by a group calling themselves “Women for Life 
on Earth”. Their initiative not only echoed the Aldermaston 
marches of the 1950s and 1960s, but also drew inspiration from 
the 1980 Women’s Pentagon Action in the United States and 
peace walks that European and Scandinavian groups, including 
from WILPF, were undertaking to link communities from 
Western and Eastern European blocs. Evoking the Suffragettes, 
it was not the walk’s leaders but a number of women who had 
been inspired to participate who played the most significant 
roles in building and maintaining the Greenham peace camp 
that inspired women around the world. 
Greenham started with one overt request—a televised 
debate about NATO’s “dual track” decision and deployment 
of the new missiles. This reasonable demand was ignored, 
and after a year of living and protesting at the USAF base in 
all weathers, Greenham hit the headlines when 35,000 women 
surrounded the nine-mile perimeter fence on 12 December 1982, 
the third anniversary of the NATO decision, in an action called 
“Embrace the Base”. Six thousand stayed through a long, dark, 
frosty night in order to “Close the Base” on a working Monday 
with a mass blockade of all the gates. Taking place a month 
after Greenham women had been imprisoned under a 600-year 
law after being found guilty of “breaching the peace” with their 
non-violent protests at the nuclear base,6 Embrace the Base was 
much bigger than anyone expected, and resulted in hundreds of 
women deciding to live at the peace camp and thousands more 
setting up Greenham support groups in their home towns and 
countries, heeding the call to “carry Greenham home”.7 Many 
 6 When Greenham women, like the Suffragettes before them, refused to 
be “bound over to keep the peace”, replying that non-violent opposition 
to nuclear weapons was for the purpose of keeping the peace, the 
inappropriateness of imprisoning women under the 1361 Justices of 
the Peace Act was not lost on the public. Soon after, charges such as 
contravening military byelaws or obstructing the highway came to be 
used more frequently instead.
 7 Recognizing that most women were not in a position to leave their homes 
and live full-time at this nuclear base, we encouraged women to “carry 
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more actions followed, from “dancing on the silos” to Women’s 
International Day for Disarmament (now institutionalized on 
24 May as an annual day of action), and from mass blockades 
to occupying significant parts of the base (like the air traffic 
control tower). Die-ins and singing, dancing protests would 
appear suddenly at political locations such as parliament, 
Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence.
One early legal initiative involved 13 Greenham women 
working with the New York–based Center for Constitutional 
Rights (CCR) and two United States Congress members on 
a legal case known as “Greenham Women Against Cruise 
versus Ronald Reagan and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” to seek an 
injunction to halt deployment of the new missiles in 1983. The 
central argument was that the humanitarian impacts and first 
use characteristics of cruise and pershing missiles made these 
weapons unlawful under United States and international law. 
However, before the Judge had ruled on jurisdiction, the United 
States and United Kingdom militaries pre-emptively flew cruise 
missiles into Greenham in November 1983.8 Even so, the case 
achieved some of its political purpose, inspiring women’s peace 
camps at North American bases and linking Freeze advocates 
with European calls for disbanding both sides’ military alliances 
and achieving a near-term United States–Soviet treaty to ban 
battlefield and intermediate-range nuclear forces.
As well as thousands of international women passing 
through the peace camp, Greenham women also travelled 
abroad to speak at meetings, giving rise to solidarity actions of 
many different kinds. Meetings were undertaken with atomic 
bomb survivors (hibakusha) from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and 
speaking tours were organized with survivors and campaigners 
Greenham home” and to show militaries and governments in all our 
countries that “Greenham women are everywhere”. 
 8 Jane Hickman, “Greenham Women versus Cruise”, and Rebecca Johnson, 
“Alice Through the Fence” in A. Paliwala, S. Picciotto and M. Ruete 
(eds.), Nuclear Weapons, the Peace Movement and the Law, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1986). See also Alice Cook & Gwyn Kirk, Greenham 
Women Everywhere: Dreams, Ideas and Actions, from the Women’s 
Peace Movement (London: Pluto Press /Boston: South End Press, 1983).
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who were raising awareness of the humanitarian impacts of 
nuclear colonialism and testing, which led to the founding 
of Greenham-related groups like “Women Working for a 
Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific” (WWNFIP). Links and 
solidarity actions were made with working class communities 
defending local industries and livelihoods, and with campaigns 
to end colonialism and apartheid, which supported the nuclear 
free and independence objectives of the resurgent 1980s’ 
interconnected, anti-racist and feminist peace movement. Over 
time, millions of women were empowered to create non-violent 
actions in their own countries, at bases, deployment sites and 
places that represented the hopes of democracy or fears of 
militarism, often with banners that proclaimed “Greenham 
women are everywhere”. Meanwhile, the experience of living 
next to a USAF base created a shocking link with women living 
near military bases across the world, from NATO countries 
to Kazakhstan, Japan and the Philippines, for a number of 
Greenham women—especially lesbian feminists—were the 
targets of sexual and physical attacks from certain military 
personnel and police. Such experiences caused even closer 
connections to be made with the core feminist campaigns 
opposing all forms of gender based violence and abuses of 
power.
Like most if not all peace movements, Greenham 
Common Women’s Peace Camp was established as a non-
violent campaign, in philosophy as well as tactics. However, 
it soon became apparent that non-violence, like militarism, is 
profoundly gendered. The prevailing male dominated versions 
of “civil disobedience” and “passive resistance” did not 
resonate with the lived reality of many women. Sublimating 
fear and anger is an expected behavioural norm for women 
under patriarchy, so being passive in the face of violence 
tends to feed into female stereotypes rather than challenging 
the purveyors of violence. Unlike Gandhi and Martin Luther 
King, Jr., many women are survivors of domestic and sexual 
violence. Hence, many of the tenets and techniques of non-
violence promoted by male practitioners have served to 
disempower women activists. To liberate women’s different 
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forms of creativity and power, Greenham developed different 
strands of philosophy and psychology to empower a strong, 
feminist praxis of non-violence that did not suppress anger and 
fear but channelled them into a powerful challenge to State and 
individual violence. This drew energy by legitimizing emotions, 
intuitions and rational analysis, so that strategies for changing 
the patriarchal status quo would be fuelled the passionate 
commitment to life, justice and the natural world (including 
scientific understanding). Greenham’s contribution was to 
demonstrate that non-violence is not merely the refusal to use 
violence, but an active, empowering and transformative praxis 
for challenging, delegitimizing and neutralizing all forms of 
personal and political violence.9
The first step political demand for a treaty to ban the 
destabilizing “Euromissiles” was achieved when Presidents 
Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty on 8 December 
1987. By 1992 the missiles had been removed and dismantled, 
though the nuclear warheads were mostly recycled. By 1993 
the USAF base was completely closed, and by 2000, most of 
Greenham had been restored as Common Land, with the nuclear 
silos standing empty in one corner in case Soviet inspectors 
should still want to check, as was their verification right under 
the INF Treaty. Having virulently opposed these developments, 
the conservative government tried to reframe these successes 
as the outcome of NATO’s “negotiations from strength”. Some 
Reagan-era memoirs have paid tribute to civil society’s impact 
on United States decision-making, however, and Gorbachev 
has cited Greenham women and the nuclear winter studies by 
United States and Russian doctors and scientists as important 
factors in his decision to initiate disarmament talks through the 
Reykjavik Summit in October 1986.10 
The Greenham peace camp largely dispersed after the 
missiles were removed under the INF Treaty. A few stayed 
 9 See Feminism and Nonviolence Study Group, Piecing in Together: 
Feminism & Nonviolence, 1983; and Amanda Sebestyen (ed.), ‘68, ‘78, 
‘88: From Women’s Liberation to Feminism, (Prism Press, 1988).
 10 Fairhall, op. cit. The Story of Greenham Common Ground, IB Tauris, 2006.
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locally until Greenham was reinstated as Common Land, but 
most others went back to former lives or moved on to other 
campaigns—still with high priorities given to social justice, 
disarmament, law and peace. I chose to use my humanitarian, 
feminist and environmental analyses and experiences from my 
five years at Greenham to redouble efforts to ban nuclear testing, 
networking with established arms control and nonproliferation 
NGOs as well as grass-roots anti-testing activists in NATO 
countries and the Pacific. When the CTBT was finally concluded 
in 1996, it was due not only to the political and diplomatic 
decisions of the negotiating governments, but the spectrum 
of grass-roots activism and NGO strategies and advocacy that 
helped to create the conditions for negotiations, including 
bringing several of the nuclear-armed States to the table, and 
promoting key objectives such as the zero yield scope.11 
Humanitarian disarmament approaches crystallized 
in the period 1993 to 2008, during which the principles of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) were harnessed by 
coalitions of governments and civil society activists to achieve 
two important treaties that stigmatized, banned and are well on 
their way to eliminating anti-personnel landmines and cluster 
munitions respectively.12 By the time of the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference, a small group of diplomats and civil society 
representatives were embarking on a humanitarian strategy to 
prohibit nuclear weapons. Recognizing that arms control had 
continued to provide a cover for modernization, this group 
transformed a small Australian project of IPPNW that had a 
 11 See Rebecca Johnson, Unfinished Business: The negotiation of the CTBT 
and the end of nuclear testing (UNIDIR 2009); and Rebecca Johnson, 
“Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation 
and the Test Ban Treaty” in Ann Florini (ed.), The Third Force: The Rise 
of Transnational Civil Society, (2000).
 12 See M. A. Cameron, R. J. Lawson and B. W. Tomlin (eds.), To Walk 
Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (1998); Richard 
Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets 
Landmines”, International Organization 53:3 (1998) pp. 613-644; Ethan 
A Nadelmann, “Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in 
international society”, International Organization 44:4 (Autumn 1990), 
pp. 479-526; and John Borrie, Unacceptable Harm: A History of How 
the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won, (2009).
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great name—the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear 
Weapons (ICAN)—into the driving coalition of civil society 
actors advocating for a nuclear weapons ban treaty. ICAN now 
has its main office in Geneva and coordinates over 440 NGOs 
in 99 countries (at time of writing). In an interesting historical 
footnote, the ICAN logo13 is a missile broken across the CND 
peace symbol.14 With an International Steering Group drawn 
from disarmament and humanitarian NGOs from Australia to 
Japan, Latin America and Africa, and from NATO members 
Norway, United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands and the United 
States, ICAN has mobilized civil society across the world 
to ensure that their Governments participate in the process to 
stigmatize, ban and eliminate nuclear weapons.15 At a time 
when most non-nuclear governments have plenty of worries 
other than nuclear weapons on their agenda, the awareness and 
political pressure that ICAN has created around nuclear risks, 
dangers and consequences—as well as the patient work of local 
campaigners to get their governments to turn up and vote— 
have made all the difference. As partners to the core group of 
governments driving this new kind of humanitarian nuclear 
disarmament process forward, ICAN has played key roles in 
mobilizing for the Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna Conferences on 
the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons (HINW), and 
to maximize votes for various resolutions and humanitarian 
initiatives at United Nations, NPT and various parliamentary 
meetings from 2012 onwards. 
Like Greenham, the effectiveness of ICAN has depended 
on the decision to reframe disarmament as a humanitarian 
and environmental issue. Instead of becoming trapped in 
 13 See http://www.icanw.org/.
 14 An original design by Peter Kennard that had been made for anti-Trident 
demos in the 1990s and was revived, with permission, as the ICAN logo.
 15 This quote is from Federal President of Austria, Heinz Fischer in 
his speech to the High Level Meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, New York, 26 September 2013 
“Nuclear weapons should be stigmatized, banned and eliminated before 
they abolish us.” Austria has been a leading Government in nuclear 
prohibition strategies since 2010, and held the Vienna Conference in 
December 2014, which initiated the international Humanitarian Pledge.
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State-centred, military-stability arguments such as deterrence, 
these campaigns have demonstrated how treaty objectives and 
disarmament strategies can be achieved by grounding advocacy 
in humanitarian concerns and civil society action. Both these 
historic approaches recognized and challenged the role of 
power, status and gender in normalizing and perpetuating 
weapons and war.16 By changing the assumptions and value 
attached to nuclear weapons and deterrence, and by creating 
international networks and alliances of civil society and middle 
powers, it is possible to accomplish what the mainstream 
arms control realists consider to be impossible—a treaty to 
prohibit nuclear weapons that will change the calculus for the 
nuclear-dependent States and their established political-military 
interests. History teaches, as Greenham women demonstrated, 
that when there is a deeply entrenched establishment, as with 
nuclear weapons, change is likely to come more swiftly through 
collective demands and networked activism than with well 
behaved, status-reinforcing steps that play into the hands of 
dominant power brokers. 
 16 OpenDemocracy has published a series of contemporaneous articles 
from me on the humanitarian disarmament initiatives to ban nuclear 
weapons since 2010, including through a gendered lens that takes a 
historical perspective in critiques of non-proliferation, arms control and 






Reducing and eventually eliminating the risk of nuclear 
violence remains a challenging task. Currently, countries that 
possess nuclear weapons and those to whom the United States 
has extended its nuclear protection in the form of security 
commitments see considerable value in the long-term retention 
and deployment of nuclear weapons. The value of nuclear 
weapons is framed primarily in terms of security through 
the practice of nuclear deterrence.2 Deterrence rests on the 
possibility of catastrophic harm through nuclear violence and 
inducement of a sufficient level of caution into State interactions 
through fear of such a possibility as to preclude serious war and 
thereby stabilise relations between the major powers. 
Nuclear weapons undoubtedly have the potential to induce 
caution and thereby change the behaviour of political actors. 
However, historical and psychological research shows that the 
political effect of deterrence is not an automatic outcome of 
the deployment of nuclear weapons or something intrinsic to 
the weapons themselves.3 Numerous studies have shown that 
there are fundamental uncertainties associated with the theory 
 1 This chapter summarises a paper on “Pathways to nuclear disarmament: 
delegitimising nuclear violence” presented to the United Nations 
Open-ended Working Group on “Taking forward multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations”, Palais des Nations, 11 May 2016.
 2 Other values are often assigned to nuclear weapons in terms of domestic 
politics and collective ideas of national identity. I explore this in 
“Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons”, Contemporary Security 
Policy, 34: 1, 2013, pp. 146-173.
 3 See Jervis, R., Perception and Misperception in International Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); George, A. and 
Smoke, R., Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: 
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and practice of nuclear deterrence.4 Research has shown that 
nuclear weapons do not induce a common and rational logic of 
escalation and control between nuclear-armed adversaries in a 
crisis.5 Deterrent threats rather destabilise by incentivising risk 
taking, galvanising resistance and intensifying crises.6
Proponents of nuclear deterrence might readily accept 
this uncertainty by arguing that the risk of things going 
wrong is very small. Yet the fallibility of nuclear deterrence 
is of paramount concern because even if the probability of 
something going wrong is small—either with nuclear weapons 
technology, organisational procedures or the practice of nuclear 
deterrence in a crisis—the effects of the deliberate or accidental 
detonation of even a single modern nuclear weapon promises to 
be catastrophic. Recent United Nations research shows that the 
human, environmental and economic effects of multiple nuclear 
detonations would be unmanageable.7 Environmental modelling 
shows that even a relatively modest nuclear exchange would 
have a disastrous impact on the global climate caused by the 
tremendous amount of smoke released into the atmosphere.8 
Columbia University Press, 1974), and MccGwire, M., “Deterrence: The 
problem not the solution”, International Affairs, 62: 1, 1986, pp. 55-70.
 4 Adler, E., “Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era”, in T. V. 
Paul, M. Morgan and J. Wirtz (eds.) Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the 
Global Age (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2009), pp. 88-90.
 5 See Bowen, W., “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass 
Casualty Terrorism” in I. Kenyon and I. Simpson (eds.) Deterrence and 
the New Global Security Environment (London: Routledge, 2006), 
pp. 50-51; Booth, K., Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London, Croom 
Helm, 1979). Jervis, R., “The Confrontation between Iraq and the US: 
Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence”, European 
Journal of International Relations 9: 2, 2003, pp. 322-23; George, A. 
and Smoke, R., Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1974) Chapter 17.
 6 Burke, A., “Nuclear reason: at the limits of strategy”, International 
Relations, 23: 4, 2009, pp. 506-29.
 7 Borrie, J. and Caughley, T., An Illusion of Safety: Challenges of Nuclear 
Weapon Detonations for United Nations Humanitarian Coordination and 
Response (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2014).
 8 For example, Toon, O., Robock, A. and Turco, R., “Environmental 
Consequences of Nuclear Wear”, Physics Today, December 2008, 
pp. 37-42; Mills, M., Toon, O., Turco, R., Kinnison, D., and Garcia, R., 
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Supporters of nuclear weapons counter that the precise 
reason for deploying them is so that they will never be used. 
They are “political” as opposed to “war-fighting” weapons 
whose purpose is solely to deter (or the far more specious 
argument that they are “used” everyday simply by existing). 
That might be the intent but the logic of nuclear deterrence 
rests on detailed, permanent and active plans, operational 
capabilities, organisational infrastructure and political will to 
deliver and detonate nuclear warheads on other societies. The 
risk of nuclear deterrence not working is a necessary feature 
of the system. The very logic of nuclear deterrence rests on the 
possibility of deliberate or uncontrolled escalation to nuclear 
violence. The cold war experience demonstrated that nuclear 
deterrence in practice is a game of nuclear brinkmanship 
and provocative threat making based on “threats that leave 
something to chance” as Thomas Schelling put it—the chance 
being massive and indiscriminate nuclear violence.9 The 
continuing risk of nuclear violence has generated deep concern 
about the creeping permanence of nuclear weapons, frustration 
at the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, and cynicism about 
the nuclear-armed States’ commitment to nuclear disarmament 
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).10
A new initiative
At the 2010 NPT Review Conference a group of States 
responded with a new initiative to refocus disarmament 
diplomacy on the unacceptable humanitarian impact of nuclear 
“Massive Global Ozone Loss Predicted Following Regional Nuclear 
Conflict”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105: 14, 
2008, pp. 5307-12. For an overview and further references see Starr, S., 
“Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict”, research 
paper commissioned by the Independent Commission on Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, October 2009.
 9 Schelling, T., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1960), p. 187.
 10 Explored further in Nick Ritchie, “Waiting for Kant: Devaluing and 
Delegitimising Nuclear Weapons”, International Affairs, 9: 3, 2014, 
pp. 601-623
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violence building on the idea of “humanitarian disarmament”.11 
They argued that the singularly destructive power, the 
transboundary health, environmental and intergenerational 
effects, and the scale of human suffering caused by the use of 
nuclear weapons would breach international humanitarian law 
in practically all conceivable circumstances. 
This gathered widespread political and popular support 
in the form of a so-called “humanitarian initiative” of States, 
international organisations and civil society actors. It led to 
three intergovernmental conferences on the humanitarian 
impact of nuclear weapons in 2013 in Oslo, in February 2014 
in Mexico, and in December 2014 in Austria at the Hofburg 
Palace in Vienna attended by 158 States.12 At the end of 
the conference Austrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Michael 
Linart, presented a “pledge” in which he committed Austria to 
“cooperate with all relevant stakeholders, States, International 
Organisations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movements, parliamentarians and civil society, in efforts to 
stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of 
their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated 
risks.” This Humanitarian Pledge was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in December 2015.13 It has now been 
formally endorsed by 127 governments.
Diplomatic pressure in 2015 took the issue into the United 
Nations system. At the United Nations General Assembly that 
October, a core group of States tabled a resolution on “Taking 
forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” 
through a United Nations working group open to participation 
 11 Lewis, P., “A New Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Learning from 
International Humanitarian Law Success,” International Commission 
on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Paper No, 13, January 
2009.
 12 For an overview see Nick Ritchie, “The Story So Far: The Humanitarian 
Impact of Nuclear Weapons Initiative”, ILPI-UNIDIR Vienna 
Conference Series, Paper No. 1, December 2014. Available at 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-story-so-far-en-616.pdf.
 13 United Nations General Assembly, “Humanitarian Pledge for the 
Prohibition and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”, A/RES/70/48, 
7 December 2015.
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by all United Nations Member States. This Open-ended 
Working Group met three times in 2016 and its final report 
recommended, among other things, negotiation of a legally 
binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons.14 In October 
2016, 34 countries submitted a resolution to the First Committee 
of the United Nations General Assembly on “Taking forward 
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” to “convene in 
2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding 
instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their 
total elimination”.15 It was passed by 123 votes to 38 with 
16 abstentions.
Devaluing nuclear weapons
The purpose of the humanitarian initiative for a number of 
civil society campaign organisations, such as the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), is to develop 
a new legal instrument to explicitly stigmatise and prohibit any 
use of nuclear weapons and their possession following the path 
of biological and chemical weapons. This stands in contrast to 
diplomatic efforts that focus on reducing the value and the role 
of nuclear weapons through the actions of those that deploy 
them. It is useful at this point to distinguish between reducing 
the value of nuclear weapons and reducing the legitimacy of 
nuclear violence.
The post–cold war nuclear disarmament process has 
generally focused on efforts to reduce the value assigned to 
nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed States. 
The security values assigned to nuclear weapons have 
diminished since the end of the cold war as the international 
social, economic and political landscape has changed, but 
this has been a limited process of what we might call “surface 
devaluing”. This refers to a number of changes that have 
 14 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Open-ended Working 
Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, 
A/71/317, 1 September 2016. 
 15 General Assembly resolution 71/258 of 23 December 2016, “General and 
complete disarmament: taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations”.
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occurred in the nuclear policies of nuclear-armed States, 
particularly the United States and Russia. They include: 
a general move away from nuclear defence and towards 
expeditionary conventional warfare; reducing the vast 
excesses of cold war legacy nuclear forces; marginalising the 
idea of using nuclear weapons for battlefield “war-fighting” 
(with exceptions in Russia and Pakistan); shifting some roles 
previously assigned to nuclear weapons to conventional 
weapons (mainly in the United States); and consolidating formal 
declaratory policies about who might qualify for a nuclear 
attack and under what conditions.16
All of this is welcome, but it represents only limited or 
partial devaluing. “Deeper” forms of devaluing that require 
more explicit changes to nuclear doctrines that would restrict 
the practice of nuclear deterrence have been largely rejected. 
These include familiar measures such as a no-first use 
agreement, de-alerting deployed nuclear-weapon systems, and 
legally binding negative security assurances. Nevertheless, 
the NPT nuclear-weapon States say this surface devaluing is 
excellent progress and fulfils requirements for meeting their 
nuclear disarmament responsibilities over the past five NPT 
review cycles from 1990 to 2015.17
Focusing disarmament diplomacy on efforts to reduce the 
security value assigned to nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed 
States in terms of warhead numbers, types and doctrine does a 
number of things: 
While it might accept that the risk of nuclear violence 
must be taken seriously, it suggests that the problem is not the 
weapons themselves or the practice of nuclear deterrence, but 
who has them, in what numbers, and how they are configured. 
It says the risk of nuclear violence can be safely managed 
for the foreseeable future through adjustments to nuclear 
posture, doctrine, consolidation of nuclear forces and vigorous 
counter-proliferation.
 16 See Ritchie, “Waiting for Kant”.
 17 For example, Statement by the P5, NPT Preparatory Committee, General 
Debate, Vienna, 3 May 2012.
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It devolves agency for nuclear disarmament to the nuclear-
armed States and their agendas and relationships.
It leaves the logic and practice of nuclear deterrence 
undisturbed and leaves the legitimacy of nuclear weapons intact 
as far as the nuclear-armed States and their allies are concerned.
This is evidenced in statements that accompany nuclear-
weapon reductions that restate an unequivocal commitment to 
nuclear deterrence and the necessity of nuclear weapons for 
national security.
Delegitimising nuclear weapons
The humanitarian initiative shifted the focus from 
devaluing nuclear weapons to delegitimising and stigmatising 
nuclear violence. In doing so, it has challenged the very 
legitimacy of valuing nuclear weapons at all—irrespective 
of whether a particular government values its weapons, its 
particular doctrine, or its operational posture in one way or 
another. 
The humanitarian initiative argues that nuclear weapons 
are illegitimate because of the appalling humanitarian, 
health and environmental consequences of any use under 
any circumstances. The risk of nuclear violence posed by the 
continued existence, spread and modernisation of nuclear 
weapons has been framed as unacceptable and the purported 
security benefits of nuclear deterrence rejected.18 The 
initiative’s coalition of States is no longer prepared to accept 
the slow and open-ended “step-by-step” nuclear disarmament 
agenda endorsed by the nuclear-armed States and their formal 
allies. Their reaction borne out of frustration with the pace of 
disarmament is challenging the legitimacy of nuclear weapons 
based on the humanitarian consequences of their use. 
This unacceptability is rooted in a collective moral 
revulsion and rejection of specific categories of violence, 
especially massive, inhumane and indiscriminate forms of 
 18 On reframing see Borrie, J. “Humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons 
and the logic of a ban”, International Affairs, 90: 3, 2014, pp. 625-46.
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violence. This has been progressively codified in legal rules and 
normative principles governing the conduct of war, in particular 
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, 
but also international human rights law and international 
environmental law. The legitimacy and authority of these norms 
and rules rests on their universality. According to these norms 
and rules, nuclear weapons are the very worst of all. 
The initiative has been underpinned by a deliberate 
strategy to move thinking about the moral acceptability of 
nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence towards 
the deontological end of the ethical spectrum. A deontological 
position denies nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence 
moral value because of the unacceptable effects of use and, 
by extension, intention to use irrespective of context. Nuclear 
weapons per se are considered illegitimate instruments of 
statecraft because any use is deemed morally wrongful and 
because the risk of nuclear violence cannot be eliminated 
as long as nuclear weapons exist.19 This contrasts with a 
consequentialist position that claims moral value for nuclear 
weapons through the practice of deterrence. This generates a 
greater good of war prevention and international stability that 
renders the possibility of nuclear use “morally tolerable” insofar 
as the ends of war prevention justify the means of nuclear 
deterrence.20 
Delegitimising nuclear weapons through prohibition
The legitimacy of a particular practice such as possessing 
or using nuclear weapons tends to rest on four broad factors: 
1) legal validity; 2) the justifiability of prevailing rules that 
permit that practice; 3) popular consent; and 4) equality or 
non-discrimination. Delegitimising nuclear weapons, therefore, 
suggests a set of processes that: 1) undermine claims to legal 
validity; 2) demonstrate withdrawal of consent for practices 
that legitimise nuclear weapons; 3) highlight and address the 
 19 Hayashi, N. “On the Ethics of Nuclear Weapons”, ILPI-UNIDIR NPT 
Review Conference Series paper No. 2, 2015.
 20 See Quinlan, M. Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, chapter 5 “The Ethics 
of Nuclear Weapons” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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discriminatory character of the nuclear weapons control regime 
under the NPT; and 4) challenge the justifiability of the rules 
that serve as a source of legitimacy for nuclear weapons.21
An obvious way of maximising the delegitimation 
of nuclear weapons is through a comprehensive, non-
discriminatory and unequivocal legal prohibition—one based 
on an alternative set of justifiable rules rooted in universal 
international humanitarian law rather than rules that permit the 
selective possession of nuclear weapons. This would undermine 
existing claims for the legal validity of possessing and using 
nuclear weapons. It would address the inequality of the NPT 
that discriminates between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon 
States. It would represent a withdrawal of consent by signatory 
governments for current practices that tacitly legitimise nuclear 
weapons, though only if a prohibition gathered significant 
support. 
A key difference between a focus on delegitimising 
nuclear violence and a focus on measures by nuclear-armed 
states to reduce the value assigned to their nuclear weapons, 
is that the problem is explicitly the weapon, not specific 
practices or specific actors. The threat to peace and security is 
not nuclear proliferation (which is a term that confines danger 
to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states), the 
threat is the existence of the weapons themselves irrespective of 
the possessor. Nuclear weapons in this framing are a collective 
international liability rather than an individual national asset. 
The underlying argument is that a stable and secure global 
society does not need nuclear scaffolding and that nuclear 
weapons constitute a continuing threat to global society rather 
than an inescapable structural necessity. 
 21 I explore this further in “Legitimising and Delegitimising Nuclear 
Weapons”, in Borrie, J. and Caughley, T. Viewing Nuclear Weapons 
Through a Humanitarian Lens (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2014). It draws on 
Beetham, D. The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1991) 
and Rathbun, N. “The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Regime”, The Nonproliferation Review, 13: 2, 2006, 
pp. 227-252.
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Emphasising the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons shifts the 
direction of disarmament diplomacy away from an exclusive 
focus on trying to change the policies of the nuclear-armed 
states. It moves it towards changing the normative international 
environment in which nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed states 
are embedded. It shifts the centre of power in disarmament 
diplomacy away from the agency of those that have nuclear 
weapons, their relationships with each other, and their nuclear 
weapons programmes. Instead, it empowers a much broader 
community of States to change the international social structure 
of nuclear legitimacy and illegitimacy, and the relationship 
between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed States. 
Delegitimising nuclear weapons is therefore about 
challenging the international social acceptability of valuing 
the nuclear weapon. It is a process of widening and deepening 
a collective normative censure of nuclear violence. It is 
about codifying that censure in a legal form to maximise its 
authority and normative effect. This might be limited or it 
could be significant. A “non-paper” circulated by the United 
States to its NATO allies on 17 October 2016 on “Defence 
impacts of potential United Nations General Assembly nuclear 
weapons ban treaty” suggests such a prohibition treaty could 
have a significant impact on NATO nuclear operations.22 It is 
about diminishing nuclear weapons as a currency of power 
in the international system. It is about extending the informal 
stigmatisation of the use of nuclear weapons captured in the 
idea of a “nuclear taboo” to the existence of nuclear weapons.23
 22 Cheshier, C. United States Mission to NATO, Non-Paper to the Committee 
on Proliferation, “Defence impacts of potential United Nations General 
Assembly nuclear weapons ban treaty”, 17 October 2016.
 23 Tannenwald, N. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the 
Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use”, International Organization, 
53: 3, 1999, p. 463. As Tannenwald explains it, underpinning the 
taboo “is the belief that nuclear weapons, because of their immense 
destructive power, flagrantly violate long-standing moral principles of 
discrimination and proportionality in the use of force. These principles, 
in turn, have at their core the moral intuition that it is wrong to kill 
noncombatants, or more generally, the innocent, and to cause excessive 
destruction.” Tannenwald, N, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the 
Nuclear Taboo”, International Security, 29: 4, 2005, p. 11.
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A nuclear prohibition treaty has the potential to perform 
that role. It would by definition constitute an unequivocal 
delegitimation through a legal instrument that categorically 
prohibits the possession and use of nuclear weapons based on 
universal principles of unacceptable harm. This, in turn, could 
precipitate a deeper, sharper, stigmatisation of nuclear weapons 
and thereby generate possibilities for change. The purpose 
here is to challenge and destabilise the acceptability of nuclear 
violence, to create what Reus-Smit calls “a crisis of legitimacy” 
for nuclear weapons, and possibilities for change in the nuclear 
policies and practices of the nuclear-armed and their allies, 
change that otherwise does not seem forthcoming.24 
This might be achieved in a number of ways. 
Institutionalising a prohibitionary norm in treaty law would 
further enhance the legitimacy of the claim that nuclear weapons 
are morally unacceptable and in doing so strengthen the norm’s 
authority.25 Institutionalised prohibitions can, as Harald Muller 
argues, compel non-adherents to justify their actions through 
the lens of the new regime by virtue of the regime’s existence.26 
New regimes can give new meanings to specific actions (such 
as nuclear sharing in NATO) whether a non-adherent wants 
it to or not. Once established, a new regime cannot easily be 
ignored. Treaty instruments also create legal, diplomatic and 
political constituencies committed to embedding, expanding and 
reproducing the regime’s prohibitions and obligations. These 
constituencies continue the “strategic social construction” of 
the norm’s entrepreneurs to actively construct linkages between 
existing norms and the emergent norm and to assign positive 
and negative meanings to actions and circumstances that 
 24 Reus-Smit, C. “International Crises of Legitimacy”, International Politics, 
44: 1, 2007, p. 157.
 25 Chayes, A. and Shelton, D. “Commentary” In Shelton, D. (ed.) 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
p. 527.
 26 Muller, H. “The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by 
Governments: The Case of Security Regimes” in Rittberger, V. (ed.) 
Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983), p. 383.
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reinforce or transgress that norm.27 Nina Tannenwald argues 
that processes of stigmatising the use of nuclear weapons take 
four forms: bottom-up societal pressure for normative change; 
normative power politics whereby States publicly delegitimise 
weapons deemed advantageous to adversaries; decisions of 
individual decision makers whose actions delegitimise use; and 
iterative behaviour over time that can become customary and 
eventually constitute non-deliberative norm adherence.28
When society collectively labels a practice such as the 
possession and use of nuclear weapons (or piracy, or slavery) 
as illegitimate, it moves it beyond the realm of “normal” and 
acceptable behaviour within that society. When illegitimacy 
is rooted in moral revulsion then that practice can become 
stigmatised.29 This is a process of separation, one that 
discriminates between those actors that engage in unacceptable 
behaviour and those that do not. Nonconformity is punished 
by shaming, moral opprobrium, sanction and exclusion 
insofar as this is possible.30 A stigma of this sort constitutes a 
prohibitionary norm. Such a norm cannot prevent a prohibited 
act if the means remain available, but it can mobilise sustained 
opposition and restrain behaviour. But a stigma does more than 
that: it can also shape actors’ identities in terms of whether an 
actor understands itself as the sort that accepts or conforms 
to prohibitionary norms or one that does not. This can result 
in changes in behaviour for actors that identify as norm 
adherents.31 As Rappert notes, “in the case of chemical and 
biological warfare capabilities in the build-up to WWII, the 
stigma against certain categories can affect whether they are 
judged as compatible with ‘military culture.’ A perceived lack 
 27 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change”, International Organization, 52: 4, 1998, p. 888.
 28 Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the bomb”, p. 13.
 29 Nadelman, E., “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in 
International Society”, International Organization, 44: 4, 1990, p. 480.
 30 Adler-Nissen, R. “Stigma Management in International Relations: 
Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society”, 
International Organization, 68: 1, 2014, pp. 147-176. 
 31 Price, R. “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo”, International 
Organization, 49: 1, 1995, p. 87.
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of such a fit can affect what resources militaries dedicate to 
these options and, in turn, their ultimate utility. In such ways, 
norms and interests are not mutually exclusive.”32 
Prohibition vs. regulation?
We can therefore differentiate two broad approaches to 
nuclear disarmament diplomacy: first, a disarmament process 
guided by the subjective assessments of the nuclear-armed 
States about the relative value of their nuclear weapons in 
different and evolving security contexts; second, a process that 
delegitimises nuclear weapons by undermining the legitimacy 
of valuing them irrespective of their perceived utility by those 
that possess them (or indeed are possessed by them). 
Advocates of a “step-by-step” and “building blocks” 
approach to nuclear disarmament tend to privilege the first 
approach.33 In doing so, they have suggested that a new legal 
instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons is either an unnecessary 
distraction from other important measures such as a Fissile 
Material (Cut-off) Treaty, a diplomatic insurgency that will 
imperil the NPT, or a deliberately divisive, exclusive and 
therefore invalid diplomatic process. These two approaches 
might suggest different priorities for disarmament diplomacy, 
but nothing about a prohibition is intrinsically incompatible 
with a step-by-step or building blocks approach, nor is it 
exclusionary or in tension with the NPT as whole. A prohibition 
and other important measures such as entry into force of the 
CTBT, negotiation of an FM(C)T, nuclear stockpile reductions, 
disarmament verification research, and other “building blocks” 
are not mutually exclusive. Political work is required on both 
physical constraints (on stockpiles, testing, fissile material 
production, and deployments) and normative and legal 
constraints (on declaratory policy, use and possession). 
 32 Rappert, B. “A Convention Beyond the Convention: Stigma, Humanitarian 
Standards and the Olso Process”, Landmine Action, London, 2008, p. 18.
 33 For an overview of these approaches see Borrie, J., Caughley, T., Hugo 
Graff, T. Lovøld, Nystuen, G., and Waszink, C. A Prohibition on Nuclear 
Weapons: A Guide to the Issues (Geneva: UNIDIR and ILPI, February 
2016);
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Focusing on delegitimising nuclear weapons does not 
diminish the importance of efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles 
and change nuclear doctrines, but neither does it restrict 
“effective measures” on nuclear disarmament to the agency 
of those that have nuclear weapons. Delegitimising nuclear 
weapons would likely change the context of future “steps” and 
“building blocks”—indeed that would be the point—but it is 
not logically incompatible with them. Indeed, United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 71/258 acknowledged that while 
“a legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons 
would be an important contribution towards comprehensive 
nuclear disarmament … additional measures, both practical and 
legally binding, for the irreversible, verifiable and transparent 
destruction of nuclear weapons would be needed in order to 
achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons”.34 A 
prohibition would challenge nuclear-weapon-State discourses 
and practices that use the NPT to legitimise nuclear weapons 
but it would not challenge the NPT itself. It would, in effect, 
recognise the inability of the NPT to categorically delegitimise 
all nuclear weapons and provide an appropriate solution that 
would constitute an “effective measure” on nuclear disarmament 
under the treaty’s Article VI, which contains the disarmament 
obligation.
Arguments about the mutual exclusivity of a prohibition 
on the one hand and a step-by-step or building blocks approach 
on the other mask a deeper opposition to the delegitimation 
of nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence 
that is still accepted as legitimate. It is resistance to a process 
of delegitimation that appears to have led nuclear-weapon 
States to largely exclude themselves from the Humanitarian 
Impact of Nuclear Weapons conferences and the 2013 and 
2016 Open-ended Working Groups. As Tannenwald observed 
in 2005, “The absence of a formal legal prohibition on nuclear 
weapons stems primarily from the fact that the great powers do 
 34 General Assembly resolution 71/258 of 23 December 2016, “General and 
complete disarmament: taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations”, p. 3.
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not want it”.35 Indeed, the United States “non-paper” to NATO 
on a ban treaty stated “efforts to negotiate an immediate ban 
on nuclear weapons or to delegitimize nuclear deterrence are 
fundamentally at odds with NATO’s basic policies on deterrence 
and our shared security interests.”36
Conclusion
The humanitarian initiative was born out of exasperation 
with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continuing 
dangers of a nuclear-armed world, and a seemingly implacable 
commitment to the logic of nuclear deterrence by the nuclear-
armed. Its core theme of delegitimising and stigmatising nuclear 
weapons has coalesced around the idea of a nuclear prohibition. 
Political momentum has now led to a United Nations mandate 
to negotiate a nuclear weapons ban treaty in 2017 under United 
Nations General Assembly rules of procedure. The process 
could extend into 2018 when the General Assembly has 
committed to convene a “high-level international conference on 
nuclear disarmament to review the progress made” on “urgent 
and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons” following a high-level disarmament meeting 
on 26 September 2013.37
A prohibition is unlikely to effect immediate change in 
the nuclear policies and practices of the nuclear-armed, but it 
will contribute to the delegitimation of nuclear violence and 
stigmatisation of nuclear weapons. Processes of delegitimation 
can take time and can evolve in complex ways as the identities, 
practices, and policies of delegitimation are negotiated through 
interaction with competing identities, practices and legal 
doctrines, such as the right to self-defence. The emergence 
of a so-called “nuclear taboo” stigmatising the use of nuclear 
weapons, the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
 35 Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the bomb”, p. 47.
 36 Cheshier, C “Defence impacts of potential United Nations General 
Assembly nuclear weapons ban treaty”.
 37 United Nations General Assembly resolution A/68/32, “Follow-up 
to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear 
disarmament”, 5 December 2013.
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of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 
the delegitimation of explosive nuclear testing through a series 
of treaties and protests culminating in the CTBT, and the 
delegitimation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons through 
the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zones are key registers in 
a long-term project of rendering the possession of nuclear 
weapons unacceptable by all States, but in particular and 
necessarily those that currently possess them. This will require 
significant support from non-nuclear-weapon States and civil 
society organisations and a sustained collective determination 
to exert normative pressure on nuclear-armed States and their 




On 27 October 2016, the United Nations made a dramatic 
stand against the violent posturing of its most militarily 
powerful members when 123 states in the First Committee 
of the General Assembly voted to ban nuclear weapons. 
The adoption of a draft resolution known as L.41,1 which 
establishes a conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding 
treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, represents a meaningful 
advancement towards their elimination. It also represents 
a revolt of the vast majority of States against the violence, 
intimidation and injustice perpetuated by those supporting these 
weapons of mass destruction. 
Revolt, wrote philosopher Albert Camus in The Myth of 
Sisyphus, is “one of the only coherent philosophical positions ... 
It challenges the world anew every second.” Camus explored 
the theme of revolt across many books and novels, finding 
that struggle not only “gives value to life” but also that it 
is an obligation, even in the face of adversity, power, and 
overwhelming odds.
Not surprisingly, most states possessing nuclear weapons or 
including them in their security doctrines have tried to suppress 
this revolt. In the weeks leading up to the vote on L.41, several 
of the nuclear-armed States actively lobbied their allies to vote 
against the resolution.2 Even on the day of the vote, Russia’s 
representative warned of the “fatal, destructive repercussions” 
 1 This draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 
71/258 on 23 December 2016.
 2 “US pressured NATO states to vote no to a ban,” International Campaign 
to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 1 November 2016, http://www.icanw.org/
campaign-news/us-pressures-nato-states-to-vote-no-to-the-ban-treaty; 
Colum Lynch, “U.S. Seeks to Scupper Proposed Ban on Nuclear Arms,” 
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of adopting the resolution, describing the initiative to prohibit 
nuclear weapons as “hasty” and at risk of “plunging the world 
into chaos and dangerous unpredictability.”3
We have heard such remarks from most of the nuclear-
armed states for the last two years. At the core of this rhetoric 
is a belief that certain states have the right to possess nuclear 
weapons. The Russian and UK delegations have outright 
declared that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) confers 
legitimacy on their possession of nuclear weapons. This 
disingenuous interpretation of the so-called cornerstone of the 
nuclear-weapon governance regime has meant that for nearly 
half a century, five countries have failed to comply in good faith 
with their legal obligation to disarm. It has meant that four other 
countries have tried to assert their own claim to power through 
violence by acquiring nuclear weapons and shunning the NPT. 
It has meant a proliferation of programmes and mechanisms to 
prevent others from acquiring nuclear weapons whilst billions 
of dollars have gone to upgrading and extending the lives of the 
ones already existing.4
It has also meant that some of their allies support the 
retention of nuclear weapons, asserting that their ability to 
threaten the rest of the world with massive nuclear violence 
provides them with security. These governments have likewise 
warned that banning nuclear weapons will destroy the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime or that it will increase regional and 
international tensions. Underpinning this line of arguments is 
the assertion that a nuclear weapons ban treaty will not have 
any positive effect whatsoever on nuclear disarmament whilst 
Foreign Policy, 21 October 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/21/
u-s-seeks-to-scupper-proposed-ban-on-nuclear-arms.
 3 Statement by Vladimir Yermakov of the Russian Federation, United 
Nations General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and 
International Security, New York, 27 October 2016.
 4 See Reaching Critical Will’s assessment of NPT implementation at 
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/
publications/5456-npt-action-plan-monitoring-reports and of nuclear 
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angering the nuclear-armed states so greatly that they might 
become even more intransigent about retaining nuclear weapons 
and make even fewer commitments to disarmament, or that they 
might even use nuclear weapons or start a nuclear war. 
Others have argued that the ban treaty is not a “quick 
fix” for nuclear disarmament and does not “guarantee” the 
elimination of nuclear weapons—which is a strange argument 
coming from countries that support incremental measures on 
nuclear disarmament, or that have previously championed 
prohibitions on other weapon systems such as landmines, cluster 
munitions, chemical weapons and biological weapons.
The reality is that the problem with the ban treaty for 
these countries is that it is incompatible with the possession 
of nuclear weapons. A legally binding prohibition of nuclear 
weapons will stigmatise these weapons. It will draw a clear line 
around them for what they are—instruments of violent death 
and irredeemable destruction. It will help make unconscionable 
the concept of these weapons providing security or preventing 
conflict or deterring attack. It will create legal, political, and 
economic obligations on the basis of this stigma. It will change 
the way nuclear weapons are treated by people, corporations, 
banks, governments, and others. It will undercut the power, 
privilege, and profit that the few seek to derive from wielding 
nuclear weapons of mass destruction.
How will a ban treaty do all this?5
A treaty banning nuclear weapons is not a panacea for 
all problems associated with nuclear weapons. But it has the 
potential to radically alter the social, economic, political, and 
legal landscape in which they exist.
An international legal instrument banning nuclear 
weapons should prohibit its parties, their nationals, and any 
 5 The following section is adapted from A treaty banning nuclear 
weapons: developing a legal framework for the prohibition and 
elimination of nuclear weapons, Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s 




Civil Society and Disarmament 2016
other individual subject to its jurisdiction from engaging 
in any activity related to the use, development, production, 
stockpiling, transfer, acquisition, deployment, and financing of 
nuclear weapons, as well as assistance with these acts under any 
circumstances. It should provide a framework for the elimination 
of nuclear weapons within agreed time frames, for those states 
with nuclear weapons that join. It should also recognise the 
responsibilities of states to ensure the rights of victims of 
nuclear weapon use or testing, require decontamination and 
remediation of affected areas, and provide for cooperation and 
assistance to meet these obligations.
Some examples of critical provisions include the 
following.
Use and threat of use. The ban treaty could introduce, 
for the first time, a universal prohibition under international 
treaty law against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. 
Some of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties include such a 
prohibition by contracting parties while their protocols prohibit 
the NPT nuclear-armed states from using nuclear weapons 
against countries within the zones. But these latter prohibitions 
are subject to reservations and conditions by those nuclear-
armed states. The ban treaty could categorically prohibit its 
parties from participating in any act related to the use of nuclear 
weapons. This would also affect arrangements of extended 
nuclear deterrence, at the essence of which is coordination for 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
Development and production. The ban treaty could 
seek to close a loophole in the NPT that allows states to do 
everything except manufacture or acquire a fully assembled 
nuclear weapon. A prohibition on development of nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems could preclude research on 
nuclear weapons and the testing of nuclear weapons systems, 
including subcritical and other means of testing. The ban treaty 
could also go beyond the NPT through a blanket prohibition on 
manufacturing or otherwise producing nuclear weapons. The 
NPT, in articles I and II, only prohibits non-nuclear weapon 
states parties from manufacturing nuclear weapons and from 
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receiving assistance to do so, and prohibits nuclear-armed states 
from assisting, encouraging, or inducing any non-nuclear-armed 
state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. 
The ban treaty could make the production of nuclear weapons 
illegal for all states parties. It could also prohibit states parties 
from participating financially or otherwise in the production of 
nuclear weapons.
Transfer or acquisition. Article II of the NPT limits states 
from receiving nuclear weapons or taking control over such 
weapons; the ban treaty would do the same. The ban treaty 
should also prohibit transit of nuclear weapons through the 
territory of states parties.
Stockpiling. The ban treaty, unlike the NPT, could 
categorically prohibit the stockpiling of nuclear weapons by 
states parties. For countries that are already nuclear-weapon 
free, the commitment not to possess these weapons would 
simply be a reaffirmation of their obligations under the 
NPT, relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, or national 
legislation. For nuclear-armed states, a ban treaty could provide 
for them to join the treaty and to accept an obligation to 
eliminate their arsenals as soon as possible and within agreed 
timeframes. The ban treaty would not need to pre-negotiate 
these provisions, but could see them agreed by states parties as 
part of the implementation of the instrument. For those nuclear-
armed states outside of the treaty, other treaty prohibitions such 
as those on assistance with prohibited acts could affect their 
incentives to continue possessing nuclear weapons. 
Deployment. The NPT does not prohibit the deployment 
of nuclear weapons. This has allowed its nuclear-armed states 
parties to maintain active stockpiles of nuclear weapons at 
varying levels of alert. It has also allowed some of their allies to 
maintain active stockpiles of nuclear weapons on their territories 
with the capability of taking possession and using these weapons 
within minutes. The ban treaty could prohibit operational 
deployment by nuclear-armed states parties and could require 
them to immediately take their weapons off deployment as part 
of their stockpile elimination plans. And, as with the provisions 
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of several nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, a ban treaty could 
prohibit its states parties from receiving, storing, installing, or 
accepting deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories. 
These practical obligations, in conjunction with the prohibition 
on use, would effectively prevent the threat of use of nuclear 
weapons, as well as reduce the risks of accidents or illicit 
acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials.
Assistance with prohibited acts. The ban treaty could 
require states parties not to assist, encourage, or induce any 
state, directly or indirectly, in undertaking any act prohibited 
under the treaty. Such a principle would be important for 
bringing the treaty to bear even on states that stand outside it. It 
could compel states to revise aspects of their relationships with 
nuclear-armed states—making nuclear weapons problematic 
rather than normal.
A prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts could 
explicitly include a prohibition on any form of financial or 
material support to public and private enterprises involved 
in nuclear weapons activities. Such a prohibition could 
increase the societal stigmatisation of nuclear weapons by 
reducing the incentives for private companies to accept any 
work related to nuclear weapons. It could also compel public 
funds and foundations from supporting any entity involved 
in nuclear weapons activities.6 In this regard, a treaty ban on 
nuclear weapons could raise the political and economic costs 
of maintaining nuclear weapons. However, the treaty could 
exempt the funding of activities deemed necessary to meet other 
obligations under the treaty, such as disarmament and securing 
weapons and related facilities and materials, while meeting 
stockpile elimination obligations.
 6 There is already evidence of financial institutions shunning producers 
of nuclear weapons. In Norway for example the sovereign wealth fund 
rejects investment in nuclear weapon producing companies. See Don’t 
Bank on the Bomb, PAX, 2013. These practices of avoiding investment 
would be likely to increase once a treaty prohibition has been put in 
place at the national level.
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As a framework for maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free 
world, the ban treaty could also include positive obligations 
for states parties. Potential principles could include measures 
related to the rights of victims, decontamination, and 
cooperation and assistance.
Rights of victims. The treaty could articulate the 
responsibility of states parties to ensure the rights of victims 
of nuclear weapons—whether from use, accidental detonation, 
or from weapons testing—and to provide necessary assistance 
in this regard. Such an obligation would build on the legal 
developments that have taken place on conventional weapons 
regulation and in areas such as the rights of persons with 
disabilities in the period since the other treaties prohibiting 
weapons of mass destruction were adopted.
Decontamination and remediation. The detonation 
of a nuclear weapon, whether in conflict or testing or by 
accident, creates distinct and challenging patterns of long-
term contamination. States parties to a ban treaty could 
recognise a responsibility to protect their populations from any 
such contamination through necessary measures to exclude 
populations from the area and, over time, through processes 
of decontamination and remediation. Whilst recognising that 
nuclear contamination presents distinct technical challenges, 
such a principle is important to make the threat and the reality 
of harm from nuclear weapons a thing of the past.
Through these provisions, an international agreement 
prohibiting nuclear weapons could have a variety of effects on 
the policy and practice of states. 
Legal. A ban treaty would establish a clear legal standard 
rejecting nuclear weapons. The existence of a ban treaty 
would offer states opposed to nuclear weapons an opportunity 
to formalise a categorical rejection of the use or possession 
of nuclear weapons by anyone under any circumstances. 
Establishing a clear rejection of nuclear weapons would 
enhance the stigma that already exists against these weapons. 
For individuals and for states, stigma shapes how certain 
weapons are recognised as unacceptable and incompatible with 
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the identities they wish to hold in the world.7 The process of 
banning nuclear weapons would require governments to decide 
whether they want to continue to support nuclear weapons or 
reject them entirely. The existence of an international treaty 
that poses this question would make a significant difference in 
international and national debates. States opposed to the ban 
will have to justify their position to domestic, regional and 
international audiences.
Political. Accession to a treaty by some states can generate 
the need to coordinate policy amongst allies, which in turn 
can raise the political costs of acts that breach the treaty and 
facilitate behaviour that is in compliance with the treaty’s 
provisions.8 States parties that belong to alliances that envision 
the use of nuclear weapons could be obliged to effectively 
renounce their participation in any doctrine or policy involving 
the stockpiling, deployment, use, or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons. While joining the ban treaty would not necessarily 
have to require any state to exit its alliance, this principle could 
compel them to ensure that their participation is compatible with 
their commitments and policies under the ban treaty.9 Similarly, 
any bilateral arrangement involving hosting of nuclear weapons 
would need to be revisited. The ban treaty could make it clear 
that nuclear weapons are illegal and states parties cannot plan 
to benefit from or support their use or continued possession. In 
this regard, relationships of “extended nuclear deterrence,” in 
which a nuclear-armed state pledges to use nuclear weapons to 
“protect” an ally, would likely need to be renounced by states 
parties.
 7 See, for example, Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United 
States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use” in International 
Organization 53.3, Summer 1999, pp. 433-468 and Richard Price, 
“A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo” in International 
Organization 49.1, Winter 1995, pp. 73-103.
 8 Adam Bower, Memo on Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, prepared for Article 36, 20 January 2014.
 9 Stein-Ivar Lothe Eide, “A ban on nuclear weapons: what’s in it for 
NATO?” International Law and Policy Institute, Policy Paper No 5, 
January 2014.
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Economic. The ban treaty could have a significant impact 
on nuclear-weapon modernisation programmes and financial 
investments in nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and related 
infrastructure. Divestment focuses on financial institutions such 
as banks, asset managers, insurance companies, and pension 
funds that invest in nuclear-weapons-producing companies. 
The divestment campaign accompanying the treaty banning 
cluster munitions has been successful in affecting the financial 
interests of corporations producing these weapon systems and 
related components. Some governments have already begun 
divesting from nuclear weapons producers. Over time this will 
undermine the benefits these companies currently derive from 
manufacturing these products. As more pension funds, banks, 
and public investments are removed from nuclear weapons 
producers, the political effects will increase.10
Social. An international process to develop a treaty 
banning nuclear weapons could provide a very different 
backdrop for national discussions on nuclear weapons. Even if 
such a process were to be dismissed as irrelevant by the nuclear-
armed states, it would nevertheless provide a strong entry point 
for critiquing the wisdom and legitimacy of investing large 
sums of money in weapons that large parts of the world consider 
immoral and unacceptable, and have deemed to be illegal.
Conclusion
The potential of these practical impacts of a nuclear 
weapons ban treaty frightens states that want to retain nuclear 
weapons. It is this that has driven some of the extreme rhetoric 
against the ban treaty and its proponents. It should not, of 
course, be this way. The NPT does not confer legitimacy on the 
possession of nuclear weapons, or on the inclusion of nuclear 
weapons in security doctrines. On the contrary, the NPT seeks 
to prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons and commits 
those that already have them to disarm. 
 10 Greg Mello and Ray Acheson, “The effects of a treaty banning nuclear 
weapons on US policy,” Los Alamos Study Group, 2014, forthcoming.
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By insisting on their “right” to inflict massive nuclear 
violence, the nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-supporting 
allies have created a division amongst the United Nations 
membership. They have forced the hand of the majority of 
states, which have gone along for decades in good faith with the 
agendas set by the nuclear-armed. This majority is now ready 
to take actions that align with its commitment to peace, justice, 
and security for all.
For this, they are being attacked and ridiculed and 
threatened by most of the states that wield nuclear weapons. 
They are being presented as interfering with matters that they 
do not understand or have no stake in. They are being told that 
they are the problem, not nuclear weapons or those that possess 
them. They are treated as if they are undermining international 
law and agreed commitments, when in reality the opposite is 
true.
This reflects a broader societal tendency from the 
“powerful” to try to stop those who act to hold them accountable 
for committing or threatening violence or injustice. This 
imbalance of power, rooted in established systems of patriarchy 
and militarism, is used relentlessly and in various ways to try to 
silence those that believe a different kind of world is possible.
This can’t be allowed to succeed. “There comes a time 
when choices have to be made and this is one of those times,” 
said the representative of Ireland in her remarks on the ban 
treaty in October before the vote on L.41. “Given the clear risks 
associated with the continued existence of nuclear weapons, 
this is now a choice between responsibility and irresponsibility. 
Governance requires accountability and governance requires 
leadership.” 
The act of prohibiting nuclear weapons is an act of 
nonviolent, positive, courageous revolt. It is transformative. It is 
long-fought and hard-won and it is certainly not over. It is a part 
of the path of a long road of activism, sacrifice, and courage 
from people the world over for decades. It is an important 
part, a critical node, and it will require more courage—from 
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governments as much as from activists—to carry forward 
successfully. 
Negotiations are set to begin from 27 to 31 March 2017 
and continue from 15 June to 7 July 2017. It will be up to states 
that support the negotiation of this instrument to lead the way, 
coming together at this conference with ideas and suggestions 
to develop the strongest treaty possible, a treaty that will be a 
critical tool in facilitating the elimination of nuclear weapons. It 
will then be up to its states parties to implement it in ways that 
make a meaningful difference.
We have a big task ahead of us. The first bold step, 
establishing negotiations for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, 
has been taken. The struggle will continue throughout 2017 and 
beyond—but it is a struggle that states, civil society, and the 
world are ready for.
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